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INTRODUCTION 
On October 3, 2010, during a routine trip to the auto repair shop, a Cali-
fornia student discovered a strange device attached to the back of his Ford 
Lincoln LS Sedan near the exhaust pipe.1  The mechanic removed the de-
vice and later that day the student’s friend posted photographs of it on the 
popular website Reddit.com, asking users, “[d]oes this mean the FBI is af-
ter us?”2  His post continued, “[I] am pretty confident it is a tracking device 
by the FBI but my friend’s roommates think it is a bomb . . . any though-
ts?” 3  The Reddit.com users’ responses suggested that it was indeed a 
tracking device—specifically, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device 
called the Guardian ST820, manufactured for law enforcement and military 
 
 1. Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, 
WIRED.COM (Oct. 7, 2010, 10:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-track 
ing-device/all/1. 
 2. Khaledthegypsy, Does This Mean the FBI is After us?, REDDIT.COM (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.reddit.com/r/reddit.com/comments/dmh5s/does_this_mean_the_fbi_is_after_us. 
 3. Id. 
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use only by a company called Cobham.4  Surely enough, the FBI showed 
up at the student’s door just two days later asking for their device back.5  
The student obliged and the agents asked him several questions, indicating 
during the conversation that they had been tracking him for three to six 
months.6  In the end, they let him go with a handshake.  No need to call 
your lawyer, they reassured him: “Don’t worry, you’re boring.”7 
Meanwhile, the users of Reddit.com reacted with a mix of surprise and 
disgust at the student’s discovery of a tracking device on his car.  “Is it le-
gal for the police/FBI to track anyone they feel like in the U.S.?”8  “That’s 
more than a little terrifying.”9  “This is officially the most insane thing I’ve 
ever seen on Reddit.”10  As a matter of fact, several months earlier the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that law enforcement could attach such 
a device to a car while it was parked in a driveway and monitor it for sev-
eral months without a warrant.11  The issue has yet to come before the 
United States Supreme Court, although the Court addressed a different type 
of tracking in United States v. Knotts, in which it held that the government 
could monitor an electronic “beeper” placed in a can of chemicals to track a 
suspect on public roads without first obtaining a warrant.12  In weighing the 
various policy implications of its ruling, however, the Court noted that “dif-
ferent principles may be applicable” when twenty-four hour surveillance or 
other “drag-net” law enforcement practices were possible.13  Twenty-six 
years later, the proverbial Greek chorus of the legal community has spoken: 
“this time has come.”14 
 
 4. Jeanmarcp, Comment to Does This Mean the FBI is After us?, REDDIT.COM (Oct. 3, 
2010), http://www.reddit.com/r/reddit.com/comments/dmh5s/does_this_mean_the_fbi_is_ 
after_us/c11bqxv. 
 5. See Zetter, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Alfadark, Comment to Does This Mean the FBI is After us?, REDDIT.COM (Oct. 3, 
2010), http://www.reddit.com/r/reddit.com/comments/dmh5s/does_this_mean_the_fbi_is_ 
after_us/c11bvvx. 
 9. Id. 
 10. TinManRC, Comment to Does This Mean the FBI is After us?, REDDIT.COM (Oct. 3, 
2010), http://www.reddit.com/r/reddit.com/comments/dmh5s/does_this_mean_the_fbi_is_ 
after_us/c11bgzy. 
 11. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 617 
F.3d 1120. 
 12. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 13. Id. at 283-84. 
 14. Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regard-
ing the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 317 
(2004); see also United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ko-
zinski, C.J., dissenting) (“1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at 
last.”); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (conceding that GPS 
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In fact, the government now has several ways to conduct twenty-four 
hour surveillance of virtually every citizen in this country, provided they 
drive a car or use a cell phone.15  In the first instance, the government can 
attach a Global Positioning System device to a suspect’s car and monitor 
his movements for an unlimited amount of time—with or without a war-
rant, depending on the jurisdiction.16  Developed by the United States De-
partment of Defense in the 1970s, the Navigational Satellite Timing and 
Ranging Global Positioning System (GPS) allows a receiver on earth to 
communicate with satellites that circle the earth on six orbital paths, and 
can typically calculate location within two meters.17  GPS devices can be 
smaller than three inches wide, attached to objects such as vehicles, air-
planes, and containers, and outfitted with wireless transmitters for remote 
monitoring.18  Once attached to the suspect’s vehicle, the device operates 
constantly, recording the vehicle’s location at all hours and transmitting the 
information to law enforcement computers.19 
In the second instance, the government may access similar information 
by compelling disclosure of location data from a cell phone service provid-
er through a court order or a search warrant.20  Cell phones are now able to 
provide even more precise twenty-four hour surveillance of citizens than 
are vehicles, given that a cell phone stays with an individual at nearly all 
times.21  However, a cell phone does not even require a GPS chip to pro-
vide twenty-four hour surveillance capabilities; rather, because cell phones 
use radio signals to communicate between the users’ handsets and the tele-
 
technology “enable[s] . . . wholesale surveillance”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
1200 (N.Y. 2009) (“To say that that day has arrived involves no melodrama.”). 
 15. For the purposes of this Note, “twenty-four hour surveillance” will refer to the ca-
pability of a GPS device or a cell phone to enable twenty-four hour surveillance, as opposed 
to the actual duration of surveillance or the degree of use of data from the devices.  In the 
case of a GPS device attached to a suspect’s car, the device operates constantly, providing 
twenty-four hour, real-time surveillance by remote monitoring. See infra notes 17-19 and 
accompanying text.  In the case of cell phone surveillance, the government may request a 
court order for cell phone location data either prospectively, or retroactively, for unlimited 
periods of time. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.  The concept of twenty-four 
hour visual surveillance is addressed and distinguished in Part III.C.1.ii. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414-17 (2007). 
 18. Id. at 418-19. 
 19. Id. at 413, 418-19. 
 20. See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies 
and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Li-
berties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17-30 (2010) [hereinafter ECPA 
Hearing] (statement of Prof. Matthew A. Blaze), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.PDF. 
 21. See id. at 19. 
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phone network, the network can calculate the location of active phones at 
any time, without any user action.22  Although both methods of surveil-
lance access similar information and are similarly intrusive, they have yet 
to receive much parallel legal analysis in either scholarship or judicial opi-
nions.  This is most likely due to the fact that cell phone information is go-
verned by numerous federal statutes and the “Third Party Doctrine,”23 whe-
reas GPS surveillance of vehicles has no statutes on point and remains 
undecided by the nation’s highest court.  Recently however, several judges 
have begun to draw parallels between these types of government actions 
due to the similarities of the privacy interests at stake.24 
The question of whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
applies to these types of government actions is governed in part by the 
“Katz test,” which asks whether the individual has a “reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy” in the area being searched.25  Complicating the issue of 
government surveillance is the increased public use of this type of technol-
ogy and the ever-increasing exposure of personal information to third par-
ties.  Many vehicles are sold with GPS devices, such as OnStar, already in-
stalled.26  The cell phone is now a portable computer, outfitted with email, 
music players, Internet, and GPS technology.27  In the latest “Smart-
phones,” GPS location features are used in a myriad of applications, such 
as street directions, mapping, finding local restaurants, and even locating 
 
 22. Id. at 22.  In fact, Professor Blaze notes that as “cellular carriers roll out better loca-
tion technologies in the course of their business, the location information sent to law en-
forcement . . . is becoming more and more precise.” Id. at 29.  “New and emerging cell loca-
tion techniques can work indoors and in places not typically accessible to GPS receivers. . . . 
without unusual or overt intervention that might be detected by the subject.  And the ‘track-
ing device’ is now a benign object already carried by the target—his or her cell phone.” Id. 
at 30. 
 23. In Fourth Amendment case law, the Third Party Doctrine reasons that a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. See 
Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) (cit-
ing as an example Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), which held that an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dials from his telephone 
because he voluntarily conveyed that information to the telephone company). 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 26. ONSTAR BY GM, http://www.onstar.com/web/portal/onstartechnology (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2011).  OnStar is one example of several security and navigation services that utilize 
GPS technology.  OnStar is included in over forty General Motors vehicle models and 
available for installation on most other vehicles through local electronics retailers. See Press 
Release, OnStar, OnStar Expands Beyond GM Cars (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http:// 
media.gm.com/content/product/public/us/en/onstar/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/ 
en/2011/Jan/0104_onstar. 
 27. See ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 19 (statement of Prof. Matthew A. Blaze). 
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other cell phone users.28  The popular mobile telephone application “fours-
quare” permits users to affirmatively broadcast their location by “checking 
in” at a given location, such as a bar or restaurant, and share their location 
with friends and other users of the service.29  Other applications like 
“Google Latitude” and Facebook’s “Places” similarly allow users to share 
their location with friends.30  Meanwhile, in other types of privacy en-
croachments, Google’s email service “Gmail” searches its users’ message 
content to determine which advertisements will appear on the sidebar of a 
user’s inbox.31  Most recently, Google has taken on the task of recording 
images of street corners in every major city in the world for “Google Street 
View.”32 
This rapid expansion of interactive technology begs the question wheth-
er increasing public awareness and use of this kind of technology should 
affect the legal interpretation of an individual’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Should private companies’ 
level of access to this type of information determine the bar at which “rea-
sonableness” is set?  In light of the burgeoning circuit split regarding 
whether GPS surveillance of vehicles constitutes a search and seizure in the 
wake of the District of Columbia Circuit Court’s decision in United States 
v. Maynard,33 this Note will examine this dynamic, including how legal de-
cisions regarding twenty-four hour surveillance of vehicles can be informed 
in part by the jurisprudence and legislative action regarding twenty-four 
hour surveillance of cell phone location data.  Furthermore, this Note will 
examine shifting ideas around an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy given the increased consent to private use of personal information 
through GPS devices on vehicles, cellular phones, and in conjunction with 
social networking sites.34 
Part I of this Note will discuss the evolution of Fourth Amendment juri-
sprudence in reaction to advancing technology, the Supreme Court and cir-
cuit courts’ disposition in dealing with electronic “beeper” tracking (the 
technology that predated GPS), and the legal doctrine governing the gov-
 
 28. Id. at 21. 
 29. See FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).  
 30. See FACEBOOK PLACES, http://www.facebook.com/places (last visited Jan. 6, 2011); 
GOOGLE LATITUDE, http://www.google.com/mobile/latitude (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 31. Ads in Gmail and Your Personal Data, GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/support/bin/ 
answer.py?hl=en&answer=6603 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 32. Google Maps With Street View, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com/help/maps/ 
streetview/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).  
 33. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 
F.3d 766, 767, cert. denied, Maynard v. United States, No. 10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 
(Nov. 29, 2010). 
 34. See infra Part III.C. 
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ernment’s use of cellular phones to conduct surveillance of individuals both 
retroactively and in real-time.35  Part II will examine the developing split 
among the federal circuits and state courts over whether GPS surveillance 
of vehicles constitutes a search, as well as the parallel concerns raised in 
recent published opinions by magistrate judges as to whether government 
requests for cell-site information from third party service providers require 
a warrant.36  Part III of this Note will argue for the adoption of a rule that 
GPS surveillance constitutes a search and seizure and should require a war-
rant because the privacy expectation—that the government is not tracking 
its citizens twenty-four hours per day—is still one that society considers 
legitimate.37  It will also argue that increasing public use or consent to third 
party use of GPS technology does not destroy an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements, nor indicate that society no long-
er views these expectations as reasonable.38  In fact, increased public 
awareness of recent technological invasions of privacy may be producing 
an increased demand for control over information.39 
I.  GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN 
INCONSISTENT HISTORY 
A. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment in the Face of Changing 
Technology 
The history of the Fourth Amendment is steeped in American colonial 
resistance to abuses by British officials; specifically, general “writs of as-
sistance” which permitted British officers to enter any dwelling to search 
for prohibited goods.40  Thus, the text of the Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.41 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the text of the Amend-
ment to mean that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
 
 35. See infra Part I. 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 38. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 39. See infra notes 404-413 and accompanying text. 
 40. Vivek Kothari, Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons: The Transformative Nature 
of GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment 6 (June 29, 2009) (unpublished article), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427476. 
 41. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
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prior approval by a judge or magistrate” are per se unreasonable, subject to 
“a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”42  If law 
enforcement violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence 
garnered from the unreasonable search and seizure must be suppressed un-
der the exclusionary rule.43 
From a practical perspective, therefore, the Fourth Amendment essen-
tially functions as a procedural requirement;44 rather than prohibiting 
searches and seizures altogether, it requires that law enforcement obtain a 
warrant based on probable cause.45  Accordingly, one of the concerns of the 
Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been providing “a work-
able accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the inter-
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”46  In general, the Court has 
noted that judicial oversight of government surveillance devices is neces-
sary to prevent abuse by law enforcement by requiring them to “demon-
strate in advance their justification for the desired search.”47  The Fourth 
Amendment “does not contemplate the executive officers of Government 
as neutral and disinterested magistrates”; rather, the historical judgment en-
capsulated by the Fourth Amendment is that unlimited discretion among 
those with investigatory and prosecutorial duties would produce pressure to 
“overlook potential invasions of privacy.”48 
Because of its historical basis in the protection of private property from 
government intrusion before the advent of the Internet, telephone, radio, or 
satellite technology, the Fourth Amendment originally functioned within 
 
 42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  These exceptions, which have de-
veloped over time, include search incident to lawful arrest, Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307, 314 (1959), consent, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165 (1974), the plain 
view doctrine, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), the automobile exception, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and 
exigent circumstances, United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1986).  
 43. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 44. See Kothari, supra note 40, at 8. 
 45. Some commentators have noted that the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly state 
that warrants are required at all; however this doctrine has been enshrined in Supreme Court 
case law. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The Fourth 
Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures.  There is nothing in the amend-
ment’s text to suggest that a warrant is required in order to make a search or seizure reason-
able.  All that the amendment says about warrants is that they must describe with particulari-
ty the object of the search or seizure and must be supported both by an oath or affirmation 
and by probable cause. . . . The Supreme Court, however, has created a presumption that a 
warrant is required, unless infeasible, for a search to be reasonable.”).  Those searches that 
are reasonable are not considered “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
See Kothari, supra note 40, at 8 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001)).  
 46. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).  
 47. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). 
 48. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). 
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the context of common law trespass violations.49  In 1928, when it first en-
countered the issue of wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States,50 the 
Court held that because there was “no entry of the houses or offices of the 
defendants,” the government had not violated the Fourth Amendment.51  
The Court began to move away from delineating Fourth Amendment viola-
tions by trespass standards in the latter half of the twentieth century.  In 
United States v. Silverman,52 the government attached a microphone to the 
heating duct of an apartment building in order to eavesdrop on conversa-
tions in an apartment.  In finding that the government had violated the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court held that a “technical trespass” was not ne-
cessary; rather, it suffices if there is “actual intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area.”53 
1. Katz and its Progeny: Defining Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
In the modern era, the Fourth Amendment is governed by the so-called 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which has generated a large 
amount of scholarship and received much criticism since its birth.54  The 
Court first dictated the test in Katz v. United States, which again broached 
the issue of warrantless wiretapping.55  In Katz, government agents used a 
wiretap to listen and record the defendant while he spoke on a telephone in 
 
 49. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
 50. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 51. Id. at 464. 
 52. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).  
 53. Id. at 510-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless and badly 
off course—yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs.”); Orin S. 
Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2007) 
(“Among scholars, this state of affairs [in Fourth Amendment law] is widely considered an 
embarrassment.”). But see Hutchins, supra note 17, at 413 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . 
provides a meaningful check on law enforcement’s use of [GPS] technology.”); Kerr, supra, 
at 507 (“What at first looks like conceptual confusion turns out to be a much-needed range 
of approaches.”).  For a list of articles critiquing the Court’s “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” test under the Fourth Amendment, see Afsheen John Radsan, The Case for Stewart 
Over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1493-97 nn.123-39 
(2010). 
  While this Note will examine different modes of analysis used by courts when inter-
preting the Fourth Amendment in cases of electronic surveillance, the primary purpose of 
this discussion is not to identify flaws in jurisprudential application of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.  Rather, this Note will suggest how existing case law and evolving social norms 
can be applied to specific instances of government action, while taking note of some of 
these critiques. 
 55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
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a public phone booth.56  The Court overruled Olmstead to hold that the 
wiretap “violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably relied” 
and thus constituted a search and seizure.57  Solidifying the shift away from 
a focus on trespassory invasions, the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment “protects people, not places,” and therefore what an individual “seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected.”58  In his concurrence, Justice Harlan iterated the 
case’s most quoted sentences: in his view, the majority’s test to determine 
whether a defendant had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a given 
area involved a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the individual “exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and (2) whether that expecta-
tion is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”59 
While it is Justice Harlan’s concurrence that came to be viewed as the 
“Katz test,” this portion of the opinion has also received criticism for being 
unworkable and circular.60  Critics argue that, while the majority in Katz 
treated the privacy interest embodied in the Fourth Amendment as a rule 
about control of information, the concurrence’s reiteration and addition of 
society’s legitimization converted the test into a “murky two-part analysis” 
that is almost impossible to administer.61  First, the phrasing of the first 
prong requires individuals to have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy.”62  For example, the defendant in Katz entered a tele-
phone booth, “shut[] the door behind him” and “[paid] the toll.”63  Howev-
er, in today’s world of satellite technology and the Internet, “[p]eople keep 
information about themselves private all the time without ‘exhibiting’ that 
interest in any perceptible way.”64  Due partly to the fact that so much in-
formation does not exist in physical form, individuals may maintain an ex-
pectation of privacy in their conversations, emails, or other types of infor-
mation, but display no conscious efforts to keep them private.65 
The second, and arguably larger, criticism is that the second prong’s 
supposedly objective inquiry—the question of whether society “recogniz-
es” as reasonable a certain privacy right—is one that is objectively unans-
 
 56. Id. at 348. 
 57. Id. at 353. 
 58. Id. at 351. 
 59. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1381, 1385-1403 (2008). 
 61. Id. at 1386. 
 62. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Harper, supra note 60, at 1386.  
 65. Id. at 1387. 
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werable by judges, philosophers, or even sociologists.66  Consequently, the 
inquiry is essentially circular: “Societal expectations are guided by judicial 
rulings, which are supposedly guided by societal expectations, which in 
turn are guided by judicial rulings, and so on.”67  The challenge of discern-
ing an “objective” standard for whether a privacy expectation is reasonable 
is exacerbated by the rapid evolution of technology, where expectations are 
neither static nor easily discernable.68  Thus, some have argued, Harlan’s 
concurrence converted the Fourth Amendment’s focus on reasonableness 
of government action and placed it instead on the reasonableness of indi-
viduals in their own privacy.69 
Justice Harlan himself has since criticized the use of the Katz test, writ-
ing that the critical question in fact should be “whether under our system of 
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citi-
zens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the pro-
tection of a warrant requirement.”70  Nevertheless, the Katz test remains 
precedential in Fourth Amendment law.  In 1983, the Supreme Court again 
applied the “reasonable expectation of privacy test” in United States v. 
Knotts,71 in which the Court addressed law enforcement’s use of electronic 
“beepers”—tracking devices that emit a radio signal which can be attached 
to an item and followed using a radio receiver.72  In Knotts, police placed a 
beeper inside a chloroform container and used it to track the defendant as 
he drove along public roads to a secluded cabin.73  Reversing the Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court held that monitoring the signal of the beeper 
was not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment because “[a] per-
son travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”74  The 
Court also found that beeper surveillance amounted principally to visual 
surveillance because it achieved the same results.75  There was nothing in 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, that prohibited law enforce-
ment from “augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
 
 66. Id.   
 67. Id. at 1392. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 1386. 
 70. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786  (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 71. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 72. See Kothari, supra note 40, at 11. 
 73. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
 74. Id. at 281. 
 75. Id. at 282. 
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case.”76  In response to the defendant’s contention that its holding would 
allow “twenty-four hour surveillance . . . without judicial knowledge or su-
pervision,”77 the Court drew a hypothetical line: “[I]f such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur,” it posited, “different 
constitutional principles may be applicable.”78 
Because the defendant did not believe he had standing to challenge the 
installation of the beeper into the container of chemicals before it was sold 
to him, the Court did not address whether the implantation itself might have 
constituted a search or seizure.79  In his concurrence, however, Justice 
Brennan wrote that it would have been a “much more difficult case if res-
pondent had challenged . . . [the beeper’s] original installation,” because 
earlier Fourth Amendment cases indicated that “when the government does 
engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to 
obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”80  At least, he noted, the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the 
installation issue with caveat emptor was incorrect.81 
The Court again addressed a beeper case the following year, but failed to 
fully resolve the installation issue.  In United States v. Karo,82 the Court 
held that the installation of a beeper into a can of chemicals was not a 
search or seizure where the owner of the can had consented to the installa-
tion before it was transferred to the defendant.83  Despite applying the con-
sent exception to a warrant, the Court still noted the potential for abuse in 
government surveillance and made its preference for warrants abundantly 
clear; requiring warrants, the Court reasoned, would have “the salutary ef-
fect of ensuring that use of beepers is not abused, by imposing upon agents 
the requirement that they demonstrate in advance their justification for the 
desired search.”84  Furthermore, the Court found the government’s conten-
tion that beeper surveillance should not require a warrant to be “based upon 
its deprecation of the benefits and exaggeration of the difficulties asso-
ciated with procurement of a warrant.”85  After all, “if truly exigent cir-
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id. at 284. 
 79. Id. at 279 n.**. 
 80. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citing Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 706. 
 84. Id. at 717. 
 85. Id.  
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cumstances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth Amendment 
principles.”86 
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that regardless of the consent issue, the 
government’s attachment of a beeper constituted a seizure, which the Court 
has defined as “some meaningful interference with an individual’s posses-
sory interests in that property.”87  By attaching the tracking device to the 
can of chemicals, the government “usurped a part of a citizen’s property—
in this case a part of respondents’ exclusionary rights,” which attached as 
soon as the can was delivered.88  The government “in the most fundamental 
sense was asserting ‘dominion and control’ over the property—the power 
to use the property for its own purposes.”89  “As a general matter,” Justice 
Stevens continued, “the private citizen is entitled to assume, and in fact 
does assume, that his possessions are not infected with concealed electronic 
devices.”90 
Because the installation issue was not thoroughly resolved by the Court, 
the door was left open for lower courts to rule differently in circumstances 
not subject to the consent exception.  Several circuit courts addressed this 
issue both before and after Knotts, with most coming down on the side that 
installation was neither a search nor a seizure.91  For example, in 1999 the 
 
 86. Id. at 717-18. 
 87. Id. at 728, 730 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
 88. Id. at 730.   
The owner of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, in-
cluding the Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own 
purposes.  When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that 
property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has con-
verted the property to its own use. 
Id. at 729. 
 89. Id. at 730 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120).   
 90. Id. at 735. 
 91. These cases generally divide into three camps.  The first camp held that attachment 
of a tracking device to a defendant’s property did not constitute a search or seizure. See, 
e.g., United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that installa-
tion of beeper to defendant’s car did not constitute a search or seizure where vehicle was 
outside the “curtilage” of defendant’s residence); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 
520 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that installation of beeper on an airplane parked at a repair shop 
was not a search).   
  A second camp held that attachment of such a device did not require a warrant, but 
did require the existence of either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United 
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that attachment of a beeper to 
defendant’s van was justified where law enforcement had “reasonable suspicion” to attach 
the device); United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1377 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
installation of a beeper on car parked on a public street was not a search where federal 
agents had sufficient probable cause without first acquiring a court order); United States v. 
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that attachment of an electronic beeper to 
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Ninth Circuit held in United States v. McIver92 that the attachment of a 
beeper to a vehicle parked in a driveway was not a “search” because the 
vehicle was parked “outside the curtilage” of the defendant’s residence, 
was open to public view, and because the defendant did not show that he 
“intended to shield the undercarriage of his vehicle from inspection by oth-
ers.”93  The court held that the installation of the device was not a seizure 
because the officers did not meaningfully interfere with the defendant’s 
possessory interest in the vehicle.94 
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, considering the issue prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Knotts, held that both the installation and 
monitoring of a tracking device constituted a search and seizure, and re-
quired a warrant.95  In distinguishing the installation of a beeper from other 
actions validated by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit found installing a 
tracking device constituted an ongoing invasion, akin to “hiding an agent in 
the trunk.”96  Furthermore, the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into the interior of the car” was irrelevant to whether the installation was a 
search or seizure.97  In considering the defendant’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the court maintained that it was “unwilling to hold that Holmes, 
and every other citizen, runs the risk that the government will plant a bug in 
 
the undercarriage of a van did not require a warrant where officers had probable cause to 
suspect a “criminal enterprise was underway”).  It should be noted that this standard, which 
allows for an ex post facto determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause seems to 
contradict directly the Supreme Court’s statement in Katz v. United States that “this court 
has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find 
evidence of a particular crime. . . .  Searches conducted without warrants have been held 
unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.” 389 U.S. 347, 
356-57 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  A third camp held that installation may constitute a search and seizure and require a 
warrant.  In United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1979), which addressed 
the attachment of a transponder to an airplane, the court held that the installation of the de-
vice could constitute a search or seizure, but found no violation in that case because it was 
attached with the consent of the owner.  In United States v. Holmes, the Fifth Circuit held 
that both the installation and monitoring of a beeper violated the Fourth Amendment. 521 
F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 92. 186 F.3d at 1119. 
 93. Id. at 1126-27.  The curtilage has been defined as “the area to which extends the in-
timate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’ and 
therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Holmes, 521 F.2d at 872.    
 96. Id. at 865 n.11. 
 97. Id. at 865.   
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his car in order to track his movements, merely because he drives his car in 
areas accessible to the public.”98 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided another case which marked the ex-
pansion of the government’s ability to utilize modern technology.  In Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court held that the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s (EPA) aerial photography of a chemical company’s in-
dustrial complex did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.99  While noting that the government generally has greater latitude in 
conducting inspections of commercial property, the Court held that the de-
fendants also had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the complex be-
cause the photographs did not reveal “intimate details”100 of the structure; 
rather, the images were limited to the outline of the facility’s buildings and 
equipment.101  The defendant also lacked a reasonable expectation in the 
industrial complex because the EPA was using a conventional commercial 
camera widely available to the public, and because its “open areas” were 
comparable to an open field, which is generally not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.102  In a later case, the Court held in Florida v. Riley that po-
lice did not need a warrant to conduct surveillance of an individual’s pri-
vate property by helicopter because “no intimate details” of the property 
were revealed and the officers were flying legally in public airspace.103 
The Supreme Court recently confronted another type of emerging tech-
nology in Kyllo v. United States.104  There, law enforcement used a ther-
mal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat within the defen-
dant’s home, from which they surmised the presence of heat lamps used for 
growing marijuana.105  Reversing its trend of relative permissiveness to-
wards new technologies,106 Justice Scalia wrote for a 5-4 majority that the 
use of a thermal-imaging device was a search and seizure because “any in-
formation regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. 476 U.S. 227, 227-28 (1986). 
 100. Id. at 228. 
 101. Id. at 238. 
 102. Id. at 236-39 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)).  Under the 
“Open Fields Doctrine,” Fourth Amendment protection generally does not extend beyond 
the area immediately surrounding a private house because it does not “provide the setting 
for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from go-
vernmental interference or surveillance.” Id. at 235-36 (alteration in original) (quoting Oliv-
er, 466 U.S. at 179).  
 103. 488 U.S. 445, 446, 451 (1989).  
 104. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. See Kothari, supra note 40, at 11. 
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area” constituted a search.107  In addressing the issue of changing technolo-
gy, the Court stated that, although it had previously reserved judgment as to 
how technological enhancement implicated the Fourth Amendment, “the 
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are al-
ready in use or in development.”108  Justice Scalia’s opinion also dis-
counted the dissent’s point that the same information could have been ob-
tained by conducting visual surveillance from the street: 
The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by oth-
er means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The police might, for example, learn how many people are 
in a particular house by setting up year-round surveillance; but that does 
not make breaking and entering to find out the same information law-
ful.109 
2. Modes of Fourth Amendment Analysis 
Thus, despite the arguably convoluted nature of the Katz test, the Court 
has generally considered several factors when approaching new technolo-
gy, including the type of technology being employed, the quantity and 
quality of information being revealed, whether the technology is widely 
used by the public, and whether the action is otherwise legal.110  However, 
the Court’s weighing of these elements is not always consistent.  For ex-
ample, in Knotts, the Court found no search where law enforcement made 
“limited use” of signals from an electronic beeper, and where visual sur-
veillance “would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.”111  
Yet in Kyllo, where the technology was also “relatively crude,” the heat-
sensing technology was ruled a search because the information revealed 
“intimate details” of the home.112  Furthermore, whereas the beeper in 
Knotts was held to be a mere substitute for visual surveillance,113 the heat-
detecting device in Kyllo was considered “sense-enhancing” and thus un-
constitutional, at least where it was not in use by the general public.114  On 
 
 107. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  
In Supreme Court jurisprudence, the search of a home is presumptively unreasonable. See 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).  
 108. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36. 
 109. Id. at 35 n.2.  
 110. See Kothari, supra note 40, at 10-12. 
 111. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 284 (1983). 
 112. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 36 (“At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 113. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. 
 114. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28. 
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the other hand, although a photographic camera is arguably sense-
enhancing, the Court held that photographs of an industrial complex were 
not a search because it was a type of technology widely available to the 
public and revealed no intimate details.115 
Additionally, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be understood 
through several modes of analysis which focus on the Court’s underlying 
concerns.116  These “models of Fourth Amendment protection” break down 
into four categories: (1) the probabilistic model, which considers the like-
lihood that the subject’s information would become known to the general 
public or law enforcement, and thus informs whether the subject could 
have had a subjective expectation of privacy;117 (2) the private facts model, 
which asks whether the government’s conduct reveals particularly private 
and personal information deserving of protection;118 (3) the positive law 
model, which considers whether the government conduct interferes with 
property rights or violates other laws outside the Fourth Amendment;119 
and (4) the policy model, which focuses on whether the police conduct at 
issue is one which the Court feels should be regulated by an impartial judi-
cial magistrate.120  These models are especially helpful in identifying prior-
ities in cases involving GPS surveillance. 
 
 115. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986); see also supra 
notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Kerr, supra note 54, at 503. 
 117. See id. at 508-12.  One example of the Supreme Court utilizing the probabilistic ap-
proach is Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).  In Bond, the Court held that the 
squeezing of a bus passenger’s luggage by a border patrol agent constituted a search because 
it exceeded the usual handling of luggage, and thus was contrary to the reasonable expecta-
tions of bus passengers. Id. at 337-39.  In the same vein, the Court held in California v. Ci-
raolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986), that aerial surveillance did not violate a defendant’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because aerial observation was deemed common in the 
modern age.  Although the dissent disagreed on the likelihood of observation by air, both 
the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the proper inquiry included the likelihood 
that the suspect’s property would be subject to observation by others. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 118. Kerr, supra note 54, at 512-14 (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 227, and 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729-30 (1984), both of which focus on whether sur-
veillance revealed “intimate details,” or particularly personal or private information). 
 119. Id. at 516-19 (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 228, and Florida v. Riley, 488 
U.S. 445 (1989)). 
 120. Id. at 519-22 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001), noting that its 
holding “assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”). 
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B. Cell Phones as Tracking Devices: The Implications of the Third 
Party Doctrine Under the Fourth Amendment 
As mentioned above, the legal discussion of cell phones is somewhat 
removed from the tracking of vehicles because government use of commu-
nications information from these devices is governed in part by the Third 
Party Doctrine, which reasons that a person has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.121  Over the 
past twenty-five years the cell phone has transformed into a portable com-
puter, outfitted with email, music players, the Internet, and location appli-
cations which utilize GPS technology.122  However, a cell phone does not 
even require a GPS chip for it to provide twenty-four hour surveillance ca-
pabilities; because cell phones use radio to communicate between the us-
ers’ handsets and the telephone network, the network can calculate the lo-
cation of active phones at any time, without any user action.123  These 
rapidly advancing developments in cell phone technology have caused 
judges, from the magistrate level to the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, to analyze the use of this information under the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test articulated in Katz, with several explicitly referencing recent 
cases addressing GPS vehicle surveillance.124 
 To obtain access to this data, a government agent may appear before a 
magistrate judge and apply for a court order to compel the desired informa-
tion from the third party service provider.  A chief function of magistrate 
judges is to issue search warrants and other orders in aid of criminal inves-
tigations, including electronic surveillance orders for pen registers,125 trap 
and trace devices,126 tracking devices, and orders for telephone and email 
 
 121. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (holding that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dials from his telephone because he 
voluntarily conveyed that information to the telephone company).  This premise has also 
been extended to email recipients and Internet website addresses. See United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]-mail and Internet users have no expecta-
tion of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites 
they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet 
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”). 
 122. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
 123. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 22 (statement of Prof. Matthew A. Blaze); see also 
supra text accompanying note 22. 
 124. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 125. A pen register is an electronic device that records all numbers dialed from a particu-
lar telephone line. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). 
 126. A trap and trace device records all transmissions from a telecommunications system, 
including both incoming and outgoing phone numbers, and other dialing, routing, address-
ing, and signaling information likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communi-
cation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
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account records.127  The increasing popularity of cell phones in 1986 
prompted the U.S. Congress to enact the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act (ECPA),128 which authorized various criminal investigative tools 
under four different legal standards: pen registers and trap/trace devices 
have the least demanding standard (the information sought must be “rele-
vant to an ongoing investigation”),129 stored communications and account 
records are accessible with “specific and articulable facts,”130 tracking de-
vice warrants are covered by the Rule 41 “probable cause” standard,131 and 
wiretap orders have a “super-warrant” requirement.132  According to some 
estimates, the total number of electronic surveillance orders issued at the 
federal level each year substantially exceeds 10,000.133 
One problem for courts in regulating cell phone tracking information 
disclosure is that “the ECPA doesn’t explicitly refer to ‘cell site’ or other 
location information from a cell phone.”134  Thus, where government offi-
cials seek to compel cell phone tracking information on a prospective basis, 
some magistrates have used the probable cause standard for a “tracking de-
vice,”135 defined in the ECPA as “an electronic or mechanical device which 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”136 
Thus, the emerging case law regarding whether cell-site location data 
requires a warrant is useful to inform the larger question of whether twen-
ty-four hour surveillance in all its forms should be subject to the warrant 
 
 127. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 79 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.). 
 128. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.). 
 129. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2006). 
 130. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). 
 131. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 132. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.).  The warrant requirement for a wiretap is often called a “super-warrant” because it re-
quires a higher standard of probable cause than an ordinary search warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(3) (2006); Samantha L. Martin, Note, Interpreting the Wiretape Act: Applying Ordi-
nary Rules of “Transit” to the Internet Context, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 445 nn.28-29 
(2006). 
 133. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 80.  During 2006, 15,177 criminal matters handled 
by magistrate judges in federal court were completely sealed from the public, and the “vast 
majority of those were warrant-related applications.” Id.  While “[t]he ECPA requires the 
Attorney General to report to Congress the number of pen registers applied for annually. . . . 
there is no separate reporting requirement for tracking devices under § 3117 or location in-
formation obtained under § 2703(d).” Id. at 80 n.2. 
 134. Id. at 82. 
 135. See id. 
 136. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006). 
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  A more detailed analysis of some 
of these decisions will appear in Part II of this Note.   
II.  “THE END OF PRIVACY”137—OR NOT?: THE EMERGING SPLIT OVER 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
Twenty-six years after Knotts, the Supreme Court has yet to decide a 
case involving twenty-four hour GPS surveillance.  This silence has left the 
lower courts to analogize between beeper and GPS technology, while at-
tempting to heed the Court’s cautionary words regarding twenty-four hour 
surveillance.138  The result has been a split among both the federal circuit 
and state courts as to whether GPS surveillance should require a warrant 
based on probable cause.139  Until recently, most of the federal circuits to 
hear the issue have hesitated to distinguish GPS technology from the bee-
per in Knotts, analogizing GPS surveillance to following a vehicle on pub-
lic roads.140  In 2010, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals became 
the first federal circuit to distinguish GPS surveillance from a beeper, hold-
ing that it constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.141  Mean-
while, several state courts had reached a similar conclusion under their 
State Constitutions.142  Part II of this Note will detail the varying modes of 
analysis at play on both sides of this burgeoning split. 
A. Cases Holding GPS Surveillance Does Not Require a Warrant 
1. Circuit Courts Finding No Search or Seizure 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to expressly address both the installa-
tion and monitoring of a GPS device in 2007.  In United States v. Garcia, 
police officers placed a GPS device under the rear bumper of the defen-
dant’s vehicle after hearing from two sources that he planned to manufac-
ture crystal methamphetamine (“meth”).143  The officers learned from the 
GPS device that the defendant had driven the vehicle to a large tract of 
land, where they subsequently found the equipment and chemicals required 
to manufacture meth.144  Relying on Knotts, Judge Richard Posner, writing 
 
 137. See John D. Sutter, The Internet and the ‘End of Privacy,’ CNN.COM (Dec. 13, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-13/tech/end.of.privacy.intro_1_online-privacy-blippy 
-social-network?_s=PM:TECH. 
 138. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 139. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 140. See infra Part II.A. 
 141. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 142. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 143. 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 144. Id. 
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for the court, found that no “search” occurred in the installation or monitor-
ing of the GPS device, because the technology substituted an activity (fol-
lowing a car on a public street) that was “unequivocally not a search.”145  
Additionally, the court found that no “seizure” occurred at the time of in-
stallation because the device did not: (1) affect the vehicle’s driving quali-
ties; (2) draw power from the engine or battery; (3) take up room in the ve-
hicle; or (4) alter the appearance of the vehicle.146  Recognizing that GPS 
technology enabled “wholesale surveillance,”147 the court conceded that 
one could “imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to thousands 
of cars at random, recovering the devices, and using digital search tech-
niques to identify suspicious driving patterns.”148  However, it refrained 
from resolving the constitutionality of that scenario until it became appar-
ent that a program of “mass surveillance” was in fact in effect.149 
The Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of GPS surveillance in Unit-
ed States v. Marquez.150  In that case, law enforcement had attached a GPS 
device to a truck in which the defendant was occasionally a passenger and 
monitored it for several months.151  They replaced the battery on the device 
on seven occasions, each time while the vehicle was parked on a public 
street.152  Tracking the device remotely, the police discovered the truck had 
been traveling back and forth between Colorado and Iowa, leading them to 
uncover a large marijuana distribution ring.153  While the court found that 
 
 145. Id. at 997-98.  The Seventh Circuit’s decision has later been analyzed as requiring 
“reasonable suspicion” for the attachment of a GPS device. See United States v. Marquez, 
605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).  However, it is unclear from the opinion that the court 
required any showing of cause; while the court noted that the District Court found the police 
had reasonable suspicion, see Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996, it did not explicitly require a stan-
dard for warrantless attachment of tracking devices.  Rather, it focused on whether the po-
lice were conducting “mass surveillance”; because it appeared the police of Polk County 
were not engaged in that type of activity, the use of GPS surveillance without a warrant did 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 998. 
 146. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.  While Judge Posner did not state from where he drew the 
rule for this particular seizure analysis, it is likely he was relying on the notion of seizure 
expressed in United States v. Jacobsen, which states that a “seizure” of property occurs 
“when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in 
that property.” 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 147. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Marquez, 605 F.3d at 604. 
 151. While the court does not explicitly state the length of the monitoring, it is clear from 
the government’s brief that the GPS device was on the vehicle from at least May 2, 2007 to 
July 21, 2007, though it is possible GPS surveillance continued through October 2007. See 
Brief for Appellee at 6, 9, United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
1743), 2009 WL 2955451. 
 152. Marquez, 605 F.3d at 607. 
 153. Id. 
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the defendant did not have standing to challenge the installation or use of 
the GPS device because he was not the owner of the vehicle, it held that 
even if he had, the surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the vehicle was traveling on public roads.154  The Eighth Circuit also 
required, however, that law enforcement have “reasonably suspected” the 
vehicle was involved in a drug ring to justify the tracking device.155  While 
noting that “wholesale surveillance” was entirely possible given the low-
cost of GPS technology, the court wrote that because the government’s ac-
tion was not “random and arbitrary,” no Fourth Amendment concerns were 
implicated.156  The Eight Circuit’s holding reflects similar earlier determi-
nations by the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits that—while declining to re-
quire a warrant—there must be some intermediate level of cause to justify 
the use of a tracking device.157 
The Ninth Circuit also recently addressed the use of GPS tracking by 
law enforcement in United States v. Pineda-Moreno.158  There, Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA) officials monitored the defendant over a four-
month period, attaching several mobile tracking devices (including a GPS 
device159) to his Jeep on seven different occasions.160  On four occasions, 
DEA officials installed the devices—each about the size of a bar of soap—
while the defendant’s vehicle was parked on a public street in front of his 
home.161  On two occasions, it was parked in his driveway, a few feet from 
his mobile home, and on one occasion, it was in a public parking lot.162  
Relying on Knotts and Garcia, the Ninth Circuit held that the monitoring of 
the GPS device did not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because the information obtained from the tracking devices could have also 
been obtained by visual surveillance, and thus the defendant had no reason-
able expectation of privacy in his movements.163  In so holding, the court 
rejected the defendant’s claim that the Supreme Court had modified its 
 
 154. Id. at 609. 
 155. Id. at 610.  In so holding, the court referred to the Seventh Circuit in Garcia for the 
proposition that police could install a “non-invasive” GPS tracking device for a “reasonable 
amount of time,” where police had “reasonable suspicion” to do so. Id.  However, it is un-
clear that Garcia actually required a finding of reasonable suspicion. See supra note 145. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See supra note 91. 
 158. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120. 
 159. See Brief for Appellant at 12, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 8-30385). 
 160. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1216. 
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Fourth Amendment analysis in Kyllo v. United States,164 which held that a 
warrant was required to use a thermal-imaging device even where similar 
information could have been obtained by visual surveillance.165  The Ninth 
Circuit found the case distinguishable because the thermal-imaging in Kyllo 
provided a substitute for action that constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment (information regarding the interior of a home), whereas a GPS 
device substituted for following a car on a public street, which was not a 
search.166 
The court also held that the installation of the device was not a search 
because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of 
his vehicle.167  However, the Ninth Circuit went even further than the Se-
venth Circuit in Garcia or its own previous holding in United States v. 
McIver,168 to hold that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy even when his vehicle was parked in the driveway of his resi-
dence.169  While acknowledging that the driveway has usually been consi-
dered part of the “curtilage” of the home (and thus a “protected space” in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), the court found that it was still only a 
“semi-private area.”170  To demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his driveway, the court held, the defendant must “support that expecta-
tion by detailing the special features of the driveway itself (i.e., enclosures, 
barriers, lack of visibility from the street) or the nature of activities per-
formed upon it.”171  Because the defendant had no gate around his drive-
way, no “No Trespassing” signs, and no “features to prevent someone 
standing in the street from seeing the entire driveway,” the defendant had 
not demonstrated that he had taken any “steps to exclude passersby from 
his driveway,” and thus could not claim a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.172  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s holding has been seen as an ex-
 
 164. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 165. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (discussing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 1214. 
 168. 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying 
text. 
 169. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214-15. 
 170. Id. at 1215 (citing United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 171. Id. (citing Maisano v. Welcher, 940 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 172. Id.  Pineda-Moreno’s petition for a re-hearing en banc was denied in August of 
2010. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).  Writing in dis-
sent, Chief Judge Kozinski decried the panel’s decision, most specifically to the point of 
whether Pineda-Moreno’s driveway, as part of his curtilage, retained a heightened level of 
privacy. Id. at 1121 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  Arguing that it did not, the Chief Judge 
argued that the Ninth Circuit had disobeyed Supreme Court precedent, which defines the 
“curtilage” as the area associated with “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life,” and states explicitly that it “warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to 
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pansion of the government’s ability to conduct warrantless GPS surveil-
lance.173 
A recent case from the First Circuit—albeit in the District Court—is one 
of the first examples of a court including analysis of public use and know-
ledge of GPS tracking technology in its determination of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In United States v. Sparks,174 the FBI 
placed a GPS device on the defendant’s black Chrysler while it was parked 
in the private parking lot of his apartment building because they believed 
he was responsible for three armed robberies in the preceding months.175  
Eleven days into the surveillance, the police used the GPS device to locate 
the defendant’s car, and while conducting visual surveillance of the ve-
 
the home.” Id. at 1121-22 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).  Ask-
ing the defendant to separately establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in his “curti-
lage,” the dissent wrote, “is like requiring the homeowner to establish a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his bedroom.” Id. at 1122. 
  Moreover, the dissent worried that the panel’s rationale for concluding Pineda-
Moreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway would affect future de-
fendants inconsistently; based on the panel’s decision, those who could afford to protect 
their privacy “with the aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, 
motion sensors and roving patrols,” would be protected by the Fourth Amendment, where 
“the vast majority of the 60 million people living in the Ninth Circuit will see their privacy 
materially diminished by the panel’s ruling.” Id. at 1123.  Under the court’s new rule, 
“[o]pen driveways, unenclosed porches, basement doors left unlocked, back doors left ajar, 
yard gates left unlatched, garage doors that don’t quite close . . . will all be considered invi-
tations for police to sneak in.” Id.  Chief Judge Kozinski framed the decision as a product of 
the lack of socio-economic diversity on the bench: 
No truly poor people are appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that 
matter.  Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the class of 
people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos. . . .  Yet poor people are entitled 
to privacy, even if they can’t afford all the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it.  
Whatever else one may say about Pineda-Moreno, it’s perfectly clear that he did 
not expect—and certainly did not consent—to have strangers prowl his property 
in the middle of the night and attach electronic tracking devices to the underside 
of his car.  No one does.  When you glide your BMW into your underground ga-
rage or behind an electric gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might at-
tach a tracking device to it while you sleep.  But the Constitution doesn’t prefer 
the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his trailer is entitled to 
the same privacy and peace of mind as the man whose urban fortress is guarded 
by the Bel Air Patrol. 
Id. 
 173. See Adam Cohen, The Government Can Use GPS to Track Your Moves, TIME, Aug. 
25, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html. 
 174. No. 10-10067, 2010 WL 4595522 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010).  Other district court 
cases holding that GPS surveillance does not require a warrant include United States v. Je-
sus-Nunez, No. 10-CR-00017-01, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76107 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 27, 2010), 
United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2010), Morton v. Nassau Cnty. 
Police Dep’t, No. 05-CV-4000, 2007 WL 4264569 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007), and United 
States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 175. Sparks, 2010 WL 4595522, at *2. 
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hicle, witnessed the defendant using the car as a getaway vehicle in what 
turned out to be another bank robbery.176  The defendant challenged both 
the installation and monitoring of the GPS device, claiming that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle while it was parked in a 
private parking lot.177  Furthermore, the defendant argued, he maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the aggregate of his movements twen-
ty-four hours per day because of the pervasive intrusion enabled by GPS 
technology and the improbability of the police conducting twenty-four hour 
surveillance visually.178 
In regards to the installation of the GPS device, the court held that the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the residential park-
ing lot, both because it was not part of his curtilage and because it consti-
tuted a “common area” of the apartment building open to all residents.179  
The defendant also exhibited no expectation of privacy in the exterior of 
his vehicle because he made no efforts “to protect or shield his vehicle 
from passersby,” such as utilizing “an enclosed parking garage, cover[ing] 
his vehicle, or otherwise remov[ing] it from public view.”180  Noting that 
motor vehicles in general are entitled to a significantly diminished expecta-
tion of privacy,181 the court held that the exterior or undercarriage of a ve-
hicle is even further diminished “because it is thrust into the public eye, 
and thus to examine it does not constitute a search.”182  The court found 
that the defendant similarly did not have a reasonable expectation in his 
movements twenty-four hours a day because warrantless visual surveil-
lance would have revealed to the FBI all of the information provided by the 
GPS device.183  New technologies, the court reasoned, did not necessarily 
warrant reevaluation of Supreme Court precedent; indeed, “highly sophisti-
cated tools” like radios, street cameras, radar, helicopters, computers, and 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at *5. 
 178. Id. at *7.  The defendant’s arguments are based largely upon the D.C. Circuit’s ra-
tionale in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), holding GPS surveil-
lance constitutes a search. See infra notes 235-252 and accompanying text. 
 179. Sparks, 2010 WL 4595522, at *4-5.  In a “modern urban multifamily apartment 
house,” the court reasoned, the tenant’s “dwelling” does not extend beyond his individual 
apartment, and thus the area of the curtilage is necessarily more limited. Id. at *4. 
 180. Id. at *5.  While such a rule was “admittedly asking a lot” of defendants, the court 
reasoned that the defendant was asking for just as much by asking the court to “protect that 
which he did not.” Id. 
 181. Id. (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (holding that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation where law enforcement removed paint scrapings from a parked car)). 
 182. Id. (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986)). 
 183. Id. at *9.  Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from aug-
menting their sensory abilities, nor has the Supreme Court has ever “equated police efficien-
cy with unconstitutionality.” Id. 
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license and fingerprint databases produce more accurate fact-finding and 
further the cause of justice.184  If a technology merely provided “a replace-
ment for an activity that is not a search . . . use of that technology does not 
render the activity illegal.”185 
In response to the defendant’s argument that prolonged surveillance and 
the aggregation of his travels produced a more intrusive glimpse into his 
life than would be available via traditional visual surveillance,186 the court 
found that while “continuous monitoring may capture quantitatively more 
information than brief stints of surveillance,” the type of information col-
lected was “qualitatively the same.”187  Meanwhile, creating a rule based 
on the length of the surveillance would produce unclear guidelines for law 
enforcement and could even outlaw visual surveillance.188  Furthermore, 
the court dismissed the defendant’s probabilistic argument by citing to the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Jacobsen189 that “the mere expectation . . . 
that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities” does not 
lend an individual a reasonable expectation of privacy.190  As evidence, the 
court noted that while citizens might not expect government agents to rifle 
through their trash on the curb or rent an airplane to conduct aerial surveil-
lance of their residence, those actions are not unreasonable searches in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.191 
Finally, the court found the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy because citizens are generally aware of the use and “power” of 
GPS technology.192  As examples of this awareness, the court cited to the 
proliferation of private use of GPS, media reports of law enforcement’s use 
of GPS technology to track Scott Peterson in the aftermath of his wife’s 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *8 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
 186. The defendant was positing a theory expressed in several recent cases, including 
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), that the whole of a person’s 
movements over time reveals more than the sum of its parts and deserves Fourth Amend-
ment protection. See also April A. Ottenberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case 
for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 685 n.171, 697-98 (2005) (suggesting that the 
aggregation of one’s movements constitutes a “private space” under the Fourth Amendment 
and that courts should require a warrant for prolonged surveillance). 
 187. Sparks, 2010 WL 4595522, at *8. 
 188. Id.  
 189. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984). 
 190. Sparks, 2010 WL 4595522, at *7 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122).  For a discus-
sion of probabilistic reasoning, see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 191. Sparks, 2010 WL 4595522, at *7 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 
(1988), and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)). 
 192. Id. 
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death,193 news articles about the “widespread government surveillance” 
conducted by the Bush administration,194 and the government’s reported 
attempts to require communications service providers like BlackBerry and 
Facebook “to be technologically capable of complying with a wiretap order 
if served.”195  Thus, the court reasoned, even if the defendant had main-
tained a subjective expectation of privacy, because of the reported wide-
spread use of the technology, society would not recognize that expectation 
as reasonable.196  Even in declaring that GPS surveillance did not require a 
warrant, the court stressed that its holding should not be interpreted to al-
low the government “to stride, unchecked, through this technological 
age.”197  However, in the tradeoff between security and privacy, the ability 
of the government to protect the public through the use of bourgeoning 
technology triumphed.198 
2. State Courts Finding No Search or Seizure 
While several states have addressed the issue of GPS tracking, many do 
so under the guise of their State Constitution.199  One recent case to hold 
that GPS surveillance does not constitute a search under both the Virginia 
State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment is Foltz v. Common-
wealth.200  In that case, the Fairfax County police used a GPS device to 
 
 193. Id. (citing Judge Allows GPS Evidence in Peterson Case, CNN.COM (Feb. 17, 2004), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/17/peterson.trial/index.html). 
 194. Id. at *10 n.16 (citing James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/12/16/politics/16program.html). 
 195. Id. (citing Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make it Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wire 
tap.html). 
 196. Id. at *7. 
 197. Id. at *10. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759 
P.2d 1040, 1041 (Or. 1988); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003). 
 200. 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).  The Nevada Supreme Court held similarly in 
Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002), that attachment of an electronic beeper did 
not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of either the Nevada Constitution or 
the Fourth Amendment.  The court followed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in McIver that 
there was no indication the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the exterior 
of his vehicle because he did not take any steps to shield or hide the area from inspection by 
others and the vehicle was parked in plain view on the street. Id.  The dissent in Osburn took 
issue with this analysis, noting that “[i]f we focus only on a person’s expectation of privacy 
for his bumper . . . I believe we are missing the real impact of the intrusion on a person’s 
privacy,” for “placing a monitor on an individual’s vehicle effectively tracks that person’s 
every movement just as if the person had it on his or her person.” Id. at 527 (Rose, J., dis-
senting). 
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track a registered sex offender in his company van when they suspected 
him of being involved in a new string of sexual assaults in Northern Virgin-
ia.201  From observing the defendant’s daily movements, they were able to 
determine that the recent assaults occurred in areas near where the defen-
dant worked and attended meetings.202  Using the GPS device and visual 
surveillance, the police were able to apprehend the defendant as he at-
tempted to commit another sexual assault.203  After finding that the privacy 
rights in the Virginia Constitution are coextensive with those in the United 
States Constitution, the court followed most federal courts to hold that that 
GPS surveillance did not constitute a search because the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement on public roads and 
showed no subjective expectation of privacy in the bumper of the ve-
hicle.204  The court reasoned that the defendant did nothing to prevent oth-
ers from inspecting the bumper of the work van, for “the vehicle was not 
parked on private property” and “the police did not need to remove a lock, 
latch, or cover to reach into the bumper and attach the GPS device.”205  
Furthermore, the installation of the device did not constitute a seizure be-
cause the defendant did not own the van, and thus it did not meaningfully 
interfere with the defendant’s possessory interests.206  The court did distin-
guish the tracking conducted by police in Foltz (which lasted “at most six 
days”) from other cases in which police tracked suspects for weeks or 
months at a time, suggesting that greater privacy interests might be at stake 
in the latter cases.207 
B. Cases Holding GPS Surveillance Requires a Warrant 
While the “split” over GPS surveillance was formerly more lopsided in 
favor of not requiring a warrant, in 2010 the “pro-warrant” side gained sig-
nificant momentum with the first federal circuit court ruling expressly that 
both the installation and tracking of a GPS device on a vehicle constituted a 
search.208  Before the D.C. Circuit’s ruling however, several lower and 
state courts reached this conclusion first. 
 
 201. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 283. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 284. 
 204. Id. at 286. 
 205. Id. at 286-87. 
 206. Id. at 287-88.  The court did not decide the question of whether the installation 
would have constituted a seizure if the defendant had owned the van. Id. at 288 n.10. 
 207. Id. at 291 n.12 (referring to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), where police tracked the defendant’s vehicle for four weeks). 
 208. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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1. State Courts Lead Off the Pro-Warrant Analysis 
As discussed in Part I, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Knotts, the Fifth Circuit in 1976 refused to hold that every citizen 
“runs the risk that the government will plant a bug in his car in order to 
track his movements, merely because he drives his car in areas accessible 
to the public.”209  However in the wake of Knotts, it was the state courts 
that first held that the use of beepers, and then GPS surveillance, consti-
tuted a search and seizure.210  For example, in 2003 the Oregon Supreme 
Court held in State v. Campbell that overt attachment and use of beeper 
was a search and seizure under the Oregon Constitution, violating the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights in the absence of a warrant or exigent cir-
cumstances.211  First, the court argued, the idea that an electronic tracking 
device merely replaced visual surveillance was “factually unsound,” for a 
beeper “broadcasts a signal that enables the police to locate, with little de-
lay, the transmitter from anywhere that its signal can be received.”212  As 
proof, the court pointed out that “the police, notwithstanding diligent ef-
forts, found it impossible to follow the defendant’s automobile through vis-
ual surveillance.”213  Furthermore, the court found the differentiation as to 
where the defendant traveled in his car—on public roads, or on private 
property—to be a useless distinction, for “whether using the transmitter is a 
search cannot depend upon the fortuity of where the transmitter happens to 
be taken by the person under observation.  In order to decide whether the 
government has search, we must look to the nature of the act.”214  As to the 
nature of that act, the court was certain: “any device that enables police 
quickly to locate a person or object within a 40-mile radius, day or night,” 
and offers no means for an individual to “ascertain when they were being 
scrutinized” was “nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal 
freedom.”215 
In 2009, two more state cases came down on the side of search and sei-
zure, specifically in the context of GPS surveillance.  The first was People 
v. Weaver,216 a landmark decision by the New York State Court of Ap-
 
 209. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d en banc, 537 F.2d 
227; see also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
 210. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Mass. 2009); People v. 
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Or. 
1988); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003). 
 211. 759 P.2d at 1041. 
 212. Id. at 1045. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 1047. 
 215. Id. at 1048-49. 
 216. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
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peals, which held in a 4-3 ruling that the placement and monitoring of a 
GPS tracking device constituted a search under the New York Constitu-
tion,217  utilizing what would become known as the “mosaic theory” of 
GPS surveillance.218  In Weaver, police installed a GPS device inside the 
bumper of defendant’s car and monitored it for sixty-five days.219  The 
court distinguished the case from Knotts by finding first that GPS was a 
“vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful” tech-
nology than a beeper.220  Rather than simply augmenting human senses like 
a searchlight or binoculars, GPS technology “facilitate[d] a new technolo-
gical perception of the world in which the situation of any object may be 
followed and exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unli-
mited period of time.”221  Unlike the primitive beepers of Knotts, with GPS 
technology, no human tracking was necessary and surveillance was essen-
tially uninterrupted.222   Furthermore, the court refused to analogize GPS to 
visual surveillance, because the visual “equivalent” to GPS technology 
would require millions of police officers on every corner of every street—a 
budgetary and logistical impossibility.223 
Furthermore, the court held, GPS technology allowed police to view “the 
whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and pri-
vate spatial spheres.”224  With the instantaneous transmission of GPS in-
formation, police could access an aggregation of location data, “the indis-
putably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure,” 
including “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, 
the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the 
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church 
[and] the gay bar.”225  The resulting picture, the court reasoned, was a 
“highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, 
of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name 
only a few—and of the pattern of our professional and vocational pur-
 
 217. Id. at 1202.  While it contains additional language concerning telephonic communi-
cations, the Fourth Amendment analogue in the New York Constitution is nearly identical to 
that in the federal Constitution. N.Y. CONST. ART. I, § 12. 
 218. The “mosaic theory” posits that the whole of a person’s movements over time re-
veals more than the sum of its parts. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); see also Ottenberg, supra note 186. 
 219. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195. 
 220. Id. at 1199. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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suits.”226  An individual’s expectation of privacy, the Weaver court held, 
was not so utterly diminished that he would effectively consent to this kind 
of invasion.227 
Finally, the court stressed the procedural nature of the Fourth Amend-
ment and noted that multiple exceptions to the warrant requirement could 
still apply, for there “likely will be exigent situations in which the require-
ment of a warrant issued upon probable cause authorizing the use of GPS 
devices for the purpose of official criminal investigation will be ex-
cused.”228 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled in accordance with New 
York’s highest court shortly after, holding that the installation of a GPS de-
vice to a minivan required a warrant because it constituted both a search 
and seizure.229  One of the few courts to rule explicitly on the issue of sei-
zure, the court in Connolly held that the seizure requirement was met be-
cause installation of a GPS device constituted a meaningful interference 
with the defendant’s possessory rights.230  Relying on Justice Stevens’ 
analysis in United States v. Karo, the court found the government had inter-
fered with two of the defendant’s possessory interests.  By using the GPS 
device to continually track his movement without his knowledge, law en-
forcement had substantially infringed on the defendant’s right “to exclude 
others from his vehicle,” as well as his right to the “use and enjoyment of 
his vehicle.”231  In contrast to the Seventh Circuit in Garcia, the court held 
that a seizure could occur regardless of whether the device drew power 
from the vehicle.232  Rather, a seizure occurs “not by virtue of the technol-
ogy employed, but because the police use private property (the vehicle) to 
obtain information for their own purposes.”233  As to the monitoring of the 
device, the court found that the defendant could maintain a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his location twenty-four hours a day because 
“[d]espite the increasing use of sophisticated technological devices, there 
has not been a corresponding societal expectation that government authori-
ties will use such devices to track private citizens.”234 
 
 226. Id. at 1199-1200. 
 227. Id. at 1200. 
 228. Id. at 1201. 
 229. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Mass. 2009). 
 230. Id. at 370. 
 231. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 232. Id. at 370.  For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Garcia, see supra 
notes 143-149 and accompanying text. 
 233. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 370. 
 234. Id. at 369. 
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2. The Bourgeoning Split: The District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
Weighs In 
In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia became the 
first federal circuit court to hold that warrantless use of a GPS device on a 
defendant’s vehicle for a month constituted a search that required a war-
rant.235  With facts that could have been drawn directly from the television 
series The Wire,236 in United States v. Maynard, law enforcement officers 
investigating two owners of a D.C. night club for narcotics violations, in-
stalled and monitored a GPS device on one of the defendant’s vehicles for 
four weeks without a valid warrant.237  The court found that Knotts238 was 
not controlling and held that GPS surveillance of the defendant’s car twen-
ty-four hours per day defeated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.239  In fact, the D.C. Circuit noted, the Supreme Court in Knotts 
specifically reserved the question of whether a warrant would be required 
in cases involving “twenty-four hour surveillance.”240  Furthermore, in 
holding that an individual traveling by car on public roads had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another, the 
Court in Knotts emphasized the “limited information discovered by use of 
 
 235. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, cert. denied, Maynard v. United States, No. 
10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (Nov. 29, 2010). 
 236. The Wire is an American television drama that examined the intersection of law en-
forcement, illegal drug trade, print news media, and the political, educational, and govern-
mental systems of Baltimore, Maryland. See The Wire (HBO television series June 2, 2002-
Mar. 9, 2008); see also Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth 
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRA-
CY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-
theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/ (similarly 
noting the parallels between the facts of Maynard and The Wire). 
 237. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
 238. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 239. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555-56.  In so holding, the court noted that the defendants in 
two of the three federal circuits to already decide the issue—Garcia and Marquez—
explicitly conceded that the monitoring of the GPS device was not a search, instead contest-
ing only the installation. Id. at 557-58 (citing Brief of Appellant at 22, United States v. Gar-
cia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2741) (“Garcia does not contend that he has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle while equipped with the 
GPS tracking device as it made its way through public thoroughfares. . . . His challenge rests 
solely with whether the warrantless installation of the GPS device, in and of itself, violates 
the Fourth Amendment.”)).  Furthermore, all three cases expressly reserved the issue of 
whether “wholesale surveillance” would require a warrant. Id. at 558. 
 240. Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983)).  For a dis-
cussion of how GPS, unlike beeper technology, enables twenty-four surveillance, see supra 
notes 15, 17-19 and accompanying text. 
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the beeper.”241  Such a holding, the D.C. Circuit found, did not indicate that 
a person has “no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements what-
soever, world without end, as the Government would have it.”242 
From this basis, the court considered anew whether a GPS device, which 
enables twenty-four hour surveillance over extended periods of time, vi-
olated the reasonable expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz.243  Under 
the first prong of the Katz test, whether an expectation of privacy is reason-
able “depends in large part upon whether that expectation relates to infor-
mation that has been ‘expose[d] to the public.’”244  An individual “does not 
leave his privacy behind when he walks out his front door”; rather, “what 
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”245  The D.C. Circuit found that the de-
fendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
twenty-four hours a day because he did not actually or constructively ex-
pose his movements over the course of a month to the public: 
First, unlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s 
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the pub-
lic because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is ef-
fectively nil.  Second, the whole of one’s movements is not exposed con-
structively even though each individual movement is exposed, because 
that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the 
sum of its parts.246 
Moreover, the court distinguished between the possibility that an act 
might occur and the expectation that it will occur: “In considering whether 
something is ‘exposed’ to the public . . . we ask not what another person 
can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a reasonable person 
expects another might actually do.”247  Thus, whether something is “ex-
pose[d] to the public,” depends not upon the theoretical possibility, but 
upon the actual likelihood, of discovery by a stranger.248  The fact that a 
stranger could never actually see the aggregation of an individual’s move-
ments over forty days indicated the individual has not actually exposed that 
information to the public.249 
 
 241. Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (noting the “limited use which the government 
made of the signals from this particular beeper”)). 
 242. Id. at 557.   
 243. Id. at 558. 
 244. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 245. Id. at 563 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). 
 246. Id. at 558. 
 247. Id. at 559. 
 248. Id. at 560 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).   
 249. Id. 
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The court in Maynard also introduced what they coined the “mosaic 
theory,” which posited that the whole of a person’s movements over time 
revealed more than the sum of its parts, and deserved Fourth Amendment 
protection:250 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told 
by any single visit. . . . The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal 
still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a wom-
an, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply 
store tells a different story.  A person who knows all of another’s travels 
can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular 
at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treat-
ment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not 
just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.251 
Thus, prolonged surveillance revealed a certain quality of information not 
revealed by individual trips viewed in isolation.252 
As to the objective prong of the Katz test, the court noted that even 
where a defendant’s movements were not exposed to the public, his expec-
tation of privacy in those movements is not necessarily reasonable.  Rather, 
the “legitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside the 
Fourth Amendment,” which provides evidence of “understandings that are 
recognized or permitted by society.”253  The D.C. Circuit began by looking 
at statutes such as California’s, which declares that “electronic tracking of a 
person’s location without that person’s knowledge violates that person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy,” thereby requiring a warrant for a GPS 
device.254  While state laws may not be conclusive evidence of nationwide 
“societal understandings,” the court found that they were “indicative that 
 
 250. Id. at 562; see also supra note 186. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  As support for this analysis, the D.C. Circuit referred to U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) as precedent.  In Reporters 
Comm., the respondents had requested from the FBI certain rap sheets pursuant to a Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Id. at 749.  The Court held that while “individual 
events in those summaries [were] matters of public record,” the subjects had a privacy inter-
est in the aggregated record as opposed to the “bits of information” of which it was com-
posed. Id. at 764.  Thus, the disclosure of the entire rap sheet “could reasonably be expected 
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id.   
 253. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 
n.22 (1984)). 
 254. Id. at 564 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2010), 1998 Cal. Stat. 449, § 2); 
see also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-42, 803-44.7 (2010) (requiring a “search warrant” for in-
stallation of a “mobile tracking device”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2010) (re-
quiring a showing of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for installation of a track-
ing device); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140 (2010) (requiring a finding of “probable cause” 
for a mobile tracking device). 
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prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our socie-
ty recognizes as reasonable.”255  These statutes, in addition to the decisions 
of other courts to which the issue had been “squarely presented,” and the 
general intrusiveness of GPS technology, led the court to “only one conclu-
sion: Society recognizes [the defendant’s] expectation of privacy in his 
movements over the course of a month as reasonable.”256  GPS surveil-
lance, therefore, defeated both prongs of the Katz test and required a war-
rant. 
C. The Intersection of GPS and Cell Phone Surveillance Case Law 
1. Background: Cell-Site Technology, Statutory Authority and Case Law 
As discussed in Part I, the government has an entirely separate mode of 
conducting twenty-four hour surveillance through cell phones.257  The legal 
discussion surrounding cell phone data is somewhat distinguishable from 
the tracking of vehicles because communications information is governed 
by several federal communications statutes as well as the Third Party Doc-
trine.258  However, several recent cases to analyze the legal standard for 
cell-site information (CSI)259 have closely paralleled the discussions of an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy present in cases addressing 
attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle.260  The primary difference in CSI 
cases is that the “tracking device” is the individual’s cell phone. 
The first issue in cell phone surveillance analysis is whether any of the 
several federal statutes governing electronic communications allow the dis-
closure of particular CSI and which standard of cause applies.  The Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),261 enacted in 1986 in an at-
tempt to strike “a fair balance between the privacy expectations of 
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agen-
cies,”262 authorized various criminal investigative tools under four different 
 
 255. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564. 
 256. Id. at 563. 
 257. See generally ECPA Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Prof. Matthew A. Blaze). 
 258. See supra note 121. 
 259. For purposes of this discussion, cell-site information (CSI) refers to non-GPS cell 
tower triangulation location data, which is currently the most pervasive method of cell 
phone tracking. See ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 22 (statement of Prof. Matthew A. 
Blaze).  Furthermore, no published opinions have allowed access to cell phone GPS data on 
a showing of less than probable cause. See id. at 84 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. 
Mag. J.). 
 260. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 261. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.). 
 262. Recent Development, supra note 14, at 312. 
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legal standards.  First, pen registers and trap/trace devices have the least 
demanding standard (the information sought must be “relevant to an ongo-
ing investigation.”263  Second, stored communications and account records 
are accessible with “specific and articulable facts.”264  Third, tracking de-
vice warrants are covered by Rule 41’s “probable cause” standard.265  
Fourth, wiretap orders have a “super-warrant” requirement.266 
The challenge for courts in ruling on CSI disclosure is that the ECPA 
does not define the standard for either cellular tower location data or GPS 
information from a cell phone.267  The Stored Communications Act 
(SCA),268 which prohibits electronic communications providers from dis-
closing stored customer information unless under appropriate legal authori-
ty, also lists cell phone records269 under the legal standard of “specific and 
articulable facts.”270  However, the SCA explicitly excludes from the defi-
nition of electronic communications “any communication from a tracking 
device,” which is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”271  Further-
more, when Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act (CALEA),272 which required telecommunications carriers to 
aid in intercepting digital communications, it specifically noted that any in-
formation acquired solely pursuant to a pen register or trap and trace device 
“shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location 
of the subscriber.”273  Thus the primary issue for magistrate judges comes 
down to whether location information from a cell phone—either from cel-
lular tower triangulation or GPS data—should be interpreted as a “commu-
 
 263. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2006). 
 264. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). 
 265. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 266. ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. 
J.). 
 267. See id. at 81-83. 
 268. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
 269. A “cell phone record” is defined as “a record or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications).” § 
2703(c). 
 270. See § 2703(d). 
 271. See § 3117(b); ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82 n.11 (statement of Stephen Wm. 
Smith, U.S. Mag. J.). 
 272. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 
(2006)). 
 273. 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)(B) (2006). 
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nications record” under the SCA, or information from a “tracking de-
vice.”274 
2. Cases Holding Both Prospective and Historical Cell-Site Information 
Require a Warrant 
Interestingly enough, magistrate judges are largely in agreement that 
prospective, or “real-time” tracking information from a cell-phone requires 
a warrant substantiated by probable cause.275  This is because the SCA ap-
plies only to “stored,” or “historical” communication data.276  In fact, “not 
one reported decision has ever allowed access to unlimited (i.e., multi-
tower, triangulation or GPS) location data on anything other than a proba-
ble cause showing.”277  To get around this issue, however, law enforcement 
need only to request the information after the time period for which they 
want to track the suspect for it to qualify as “historical” rather than “pros-
pective” information.278  In turn, several magistrate judges in the past few 
years have ruled that historical CSI also requires a showing of probable 
cause, because it is essentially location-tracking information.279 
 
 274. See ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82-83 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. 
Mag. J.). 
 275. See id. at 84 (“Surveying the published opinions, it is fair to conclude that the major-
ity held that probable cause is the appropriate standard for government access to prospective 
cell site information.”); see also In re Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2008) [hereinafter Leni-
han Opinion] (“[A] significant majority of Courts have rejected the Government’s conten-
tion that real-time, or prospective, movement/location information may be obtained under a 
hybrid theory which purports to combine the authorities of the [Pen Register Statute] and the 
SCA by seizing upon the term ‘solely’ in a provision of the CALEA.”), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 
2008 WL 4191511, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 304, 
319 (3rd Cir. Sept. 7, 2010). 
 276. See ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 82-83 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. 
Mag. J.) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2006)). 
 277. Id. at 84.  Those decisions which have allowed disclosure of prospective CSI restrict 
their holdings to “limited CSI” only, defined as information from a particular tower or par-
ticular phone call (as opposed to multi-tower triangulation information or GPS location da-
ta). Id. at 83 n.16, 84.  One of the inherent difficulties in assessing the decisions of magi-
strate judges is that most do not publish their opinions when they grant applications for 
orders.  Thus, as Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith testified before Congress, published opi-
nions may not be representative of judicial opinion as a whole. Id. at 84 n.20. 
 278. See id. at 84-85. 
 279. See, e.g., In re U.S. Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 
10-MJ-0550, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
Orenstein Opinion]; Lenihan Opinion, supra note 275; In Re Application For Pen Register 
And Trap/Trace Device With Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. 
Tex. 2005) [hereinafter Smith Opinion] (rejecting the government’s application for CSI on a 
prospective basis). 
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In 2008, for example, a magistrate judge in the Western District of Penn-
sylvania published an opinion on behalf of all magistrate judges sitting in 
that district, holding that both prospective and historical CSI required a 
showing of probable cause.280  Writing for the court, Judge Lenihan rea-
soned that both the text and the legislative history of the ECPA and its 
amendments warranted no distinction between real-time and stored CSI.281  
A cell phone that is “used to provide the government with movement or lo-
cation information,” the court held, is a “tracking device” within the mean-
ing of the SCA, and historical CSI “remains information from a tracking 
device.”282  Furthermore, the court wrote, even if this information were 
within the scope of the SCA, to read the statute that way might “erode tra-
ditional Fourth Amendment protections” and render the SCA unconstitu-
tional.283 
Under the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis, because Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a showing of probable cause 
for tracking devices, any interpretation that would allow disclosure at a 
lower standard would “violate Americans’ reasonable expectation of priva-
cy . . . as to their physical movements/locations.”284  Judge Lenihan expli-
citly applied the Katz test, finding that first, most Americans “do not gener-
ally know that a record of their whereabouts is being created whenever they 
travel about with their cell phones, or that such record is likely maintained 
by their cell phone providers and is potentially subject to review by inter-
ested Government officials.”285  Second, she wrote, “most Americans 
would be appalled by the notion that the Government could obtain such a 
record without at least a neutral, judicial determination of probable 
cause.”286  Citing United States v. Karo,287 Judge Lenihan noted further 
that a cell phone travels with a person onto private property, and thus a 
warrant should be required.288  However, she also criticized this “pub-
lic/private dichotomy,” because “routine allowance of location information 
 
 280. See Lenihan Opinion, supra note 275, at 602-03. 
 281. Id. at 610 (“The relevant legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend its 
electronic communications legislation to be read to require . . . disclosure of an individual’s 
location information; to the contrary in enacting the legislation it relied on express represen-
tation by law enforcement that it was not seeking to amend the background standards go-
verning the disclosure of movement/location information.  The ECPA and the CALEA were 
careful to exempt this information from their reach.”). 
 282. Id. at 602-03. 
 283. Id. at 610. 
 284. Id. at 610-11. 
 285. Id. at 611. 
 286. Id. 
 287. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 288. Lenihan Opinion, supra note 275, at 612-13. 
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up to the threshold of the private domain would necessitate increasingly-
difficult line-drawing at the margins.”289  Instead, she relied on the “bee-
per” decisions of State v. Campbell290 and State v. Jackson291 (both of 
which required a warrant for the use of an electronic tracking device) to 
find that that the “privacy and associational interests” of CSI disclosure 
implicated the Fourth Amendment, and were not “diminished by a delay in 
disclosure.”292 
More recently, in August of 2010, Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the 
Eastern District of New York issued a similar opinion holding that both 
prospective and historical cell-site information required a warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment.293  Judge Orenstein’s opinion represents the closest 
intersection between GPS vehicle surveillance and cell phone surveillance 
yet, as he relies explicitly on several GPS cases referred to in Part II.A-B of 
this Note.294  The opinion also rejects the premise that increasing public 
awareness or use of GPS technology and location-sharing applications 
might diminish an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements twenty-four hours per day.295 
In the case, the government sought an order pursuant to the SCA direct-
ing Sprint Nextel to disclose all calls and text messages, as well as certain 
historical CSI, from a mobile telephone for a period of fifty-eight days.296  
The government proffered “specific and articulable facts,” but specifically 
declined to seek a warrant.297  At the outset, Judge Orenstein noted that the 
case law on the issue was unsettled, resulting in “an unpredictable legal re-
gime in which an individual’s right to privacy waxes and wanes based on 
 
 289. Id. at 613. 
 290. 759 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Or. 1988). 
 291. 76 P.3d 217, 231 (Wash. 2003). 
 292. Lenihan Opinion, supra note 275, at 613.  Judge Lenihan’s decision was subse-
quently affirmed by the District Court in In re Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), but was then vacated and remanded in In re Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3rd 
Cir. 2010); however, because the Third Circuit’s decision retained for magistrate judges the 
discretion to require probable cause for historical cell-site information, it has been seen as a 
victory among privacy advocates. See David Kravets, Court Rebuffs Obama on Warrantless 
Cell-Site Tracking, WIRED.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/ 
cell-site-warrants. 
 293. See Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279. 
 294. See id. at *11-15. 
 295. See id. at *46-50. 
 296. Id. at *1. 
 297. Id. at *1-2.  After the magistrate judge expressed concern to the government that 
recent case law might require a showing of probable cause to satisfy Fourth Amendment 
concerns, the government submitted a revised application stating: “Although not required, 
the government submits that the facts set forth herein provide . . . probable cause.” Id. at *3. 
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the fortuity of the location in which an investigation is based.”298  Howev-
er, Judge Orenstein wrote, even though he believed the SCA permitted him 
to issue the order based on a lower standard of cause, he believed that the 
Fourth Amendment prevented him from ordering the disclosure of the in-
formation without a showing of probable cause.299 
In his analysis, Judge Orenstein relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s de-
cision in United States v. Maynard,300 “both with respect to its demonstra-
tion that Knotts is not dispositive on the issue of prolonged location track-
ing,” and its examination of “the privacy interest at stake when the 
government uses technological means to accomplish the kind of prolonged, 
continuous, and detailed surveillance that would otherwise be impossi-
ble.”301  In accepting these arguments, Judge Orenstein identified “a grow-
ing recognition” that: 
[T]echnology has progressed to the point where a person who wishes to 
partake in the social, cultural, and political affairs of our society has no 
realistic choice but to expose to others, if not to the public as a whole, a 
broad range of conduct and communications that would previously have 
been deemed unquestionably private.302 
In light of these constraints on privacy, Judge Orenstein concluded that 
magistrate judges presented with requests for warrantless location-tracking 
“must carefully re-examine the constitutionality of such investigative tech-
niques . . . it is no longer enough to dismiss the need for such analysis by 
relying on cases such as Knotts.”303 
In regards to the applicability of the Third Party Doctrine, Judge Orens-
tein referred to a Sixth Circuit decision, United States v. Warshak,304 which 
found that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tent of his emails despite his understanding that his Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP) maintained independent access to those messages.305  He also 
pointed to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Forest,306 which, 
 
 298. Id. at *8.  
 299. Id. at *6-9. 
 300. 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that an individual had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his movements twenty-four hours per day over a prolonged period of 
time, and thus attachment and monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle required a warrant). 
 301. See Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *19. 
 302. Id. at *11-12. 
 303. Id. at *13. 
 304. 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded, 532 F.3d 521 (2008), aff’d on 
appeal after remand, United States v. Warshak, Nos. 08-3997, 08-4212, 08-4085, 08-4429, 
08-4087, 09-3176, 2010 WL 5071766 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010). 
 305. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *26 (citing Warshak, 490 F.3d at 460). 
 306. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 
1100 (2005). 
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while later vacated on other grounds, found that unlike the dialed telephone 
numbers, cell phone location information is not “voluntarily conveyed” by 
the user to cellular service providers.307  Both cases, Judge Orenstein rea-
soned, demonstrated that simply because a company could access the con-
tent of emails or cell phone communications, “the privacy expectation in 
the content of either is not diminished, because there is a societal expecta-
tion that the ISP or the phone company will not do so as a matter of 
course.”308 
Thus, in his analysis, Judge Orenstein identified a growing tension be-
tween the Third Party Doctrine and Fourth Amendment protections when it 
comes to developing technology.  That is, as public use of certain technol-
ogy increases, and disclosure of location information to third party service 
providers increases, what is the attendant effect on subjective and objective 
reasonable expectations of privacy?  As evidence of this tension, Judge 
Orenstein noted several growing sectors of technology where users are uti-
lizing GPS technology through their phones, vehicles, or computers.  Many 
cell phones now have GPS technology on them for mapping and other loca-
tion-based applications.309  Mobile phone applications such as “foursquare” 
allow users to “check in” at a given location, such as a bar or restaurant, 
 
 307. See Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *30 (citing Smith Opinion, supra note 
279, at 756-57).  While the Sixth Circuit rejected the analogy between the telephone num-
bers in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and cell-site information from a mobile 
phone, it ultimately dismissed the defendant’s constitutional claims on the grounds that gov-
ernment surveillance took place on public highways where the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. See Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *30 (citing Smith Opi-
nion, supra note 279, at 756-57). 
 308. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *28.  In response to the government’s reliance 
on United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976), which held that an individual had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records on the grounds that such documents were 
not “private papers” but “business records of the banks,” Judge Orenstein noted that the 
government could rely on the Bank Secrecy Act as an expression by Congress that “people 
should not expect to maintain privacy in financial records conveyed to banks because of the 
burden such privacy rights would impose on other important societal interests.” Orenstein 
Opinion, supra note 279, at *33.  In the case of cell phone location information however, the 
Telecommunications Act does “precisely the opposite: it expresses legislative approval for 
the idea that a caller should expect her location information to remain private notwithstand-
ing the unavoidable need to share it with a third-party service provider.” Id. (citing the 
Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, § 5, 113 Stat. 
1288 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2006)) (“[W]ithout the express prior authorization of 
the customer, a customer shall not be considered to have approved the use or disclosure of 
or access to . . . call location information concerning the user of a commercial mobile ser-
vice.”). 
 309. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *50.  Furthermore, “[t]he Federal Communi-
cations Commission’s Enhanced 911 Emergency Call Systems rules require a cellular ser-
vice provider to equip mobile telephones with the ability to identify their locations to some 
degree of precision.” Id. at *50-51 n.20. 
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and share their location with friends and other users of the service.310  Oth-
er applications like “Google Latitude” similarly allow users to share their 
location with friends.311  At the same time, Judge Orenstein noted, these 
applications each have privacy statements that inform the users how they 
can control sharing and deleting their location information.312  Foursquare, 
for example, acknowledges that “an important concern for most anyone us-
ing location-based services is privacy.”313  Its privacy statement strives to 
make its subscribers “comfortable with how [location-tracking] information 
is shared via foursquare,’” and offers a range of “robust privacy controls 
[that] give users control over the amount of information they share about 
their location.”314  Google Latitude permits users to “share, set, hide your 
location, or sign out of Google Latitude” and to “[c]ontrol who sees your 
location, and at what level of detail.”315  Google Mobile, meanwhile, alerts 
users: “If you use location-enabled products and services, such as Google 
Maps for mobile, you may be sending us location information.”316 
Thus, Judge Orenstein concluded, it is very likely that “most people 
are—or will soon be—aware” that they are sharing location information in 
some capacity.317  However, by focusing on and seeking to quiet consum-
ers’ privacy concerns over use of their location information, these compa-
nies were fostering an “actual—and to my mind reasonable—expectation 
that such information will remain private to the extent a subscriber chooses 
to make it so.”318  As further evidence of the reasonableness of privacy ex-
pectations regarding an individual’s location information, Judge Orenstein 
cited to several articles which “illustrate [a] growing awareness and con-
cern” surrounding use of GPS surveillance,319 including a Time Magazine 
article which called the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Pineda-
 
 310. Id. at *47-48 (citing FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com/privacy). 
 311. Id. at *48 (citing GOOGLE LATITUDE, http://www.google.com/mobile/latitude). 
 312. Id. at *48-49. 
 313. Id. at *48; see also Privacy 101, FOURSQUARE (Dec. 20, 2010), http://foursquare. 
com/privacy. 
 314. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *48; see also Privacy 101, supra note 313. 
 315. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *48 (citing GOOGLE LATITUDE, http://www. 
google.com/mobile/latitude). 
 316. Id. (quoting Google Mobile Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www. 
google.com/mobile/privacy.html). 
 317. Id. at *46. 
 318. Id. at *49 n.19. 
 319. Id. at *51 n.21 (citing Cohen, supra note 173; Farhad Manjoo, Facebook Knows 
Where You Are, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2264492. 
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Moreno a “bizarre,” “scary,” and “dangerous” decision that “could turn 
America into the sort of totalitarian state imagined by George Orwell.”320 
Ultimately, even if mobile telephone users were aware of the fact that 
they expose themselves to location tracking, Judge Orenstein reasoned, that 
assumption did not preclude the idea that individuals still maintained a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their movements: “To the contrary, I be-
lieve that a growing awareness of the possibility of location tracking of 
mobile telephones has also produced a growing expectation that such track-
ing can and should be controlled.”321 
Judge Orenstein’s opinion represents a convergence of reasoning sur-
rounding the issue of cell phone and vehicle surveillance by the govern-
ment.  This intersection makes sense for several reasons, not least of all be-
cause many citizens might not know or care about the distinctions legal 
scholars and judges make between such surveillance under the Third Party 
Doctrine or the automobile exception to the warrant.  Part III of this Note 
further examines the intersection of these cases and argues for Judge 
Orenstein’s and the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of an individual’s reason-
able expectation of privacy in his movements against twenty-four hour 
technological government surveillance, even in a world of increasing pub-
lic use and awareness of location-based technology. 
III.  REVIVING PRIVACY: WHY GPS SURVEILLANCE VIOLATES THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SHOULD REQUIRE A WARRANT 
Justice Harlan’s restatement of his interpretation of the Katz test asked 
“whether under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, 
we should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or ob-
server without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.”322  While 
2010 has seen a number of privacy infractions, it has also seen a string of 
decisions boosting Americans’ privacy interests in the age of digital tech-
nology.323  The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Maynard324 and Judge Orens-
 
 320. See Cohen, supra note 173; see also GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).  Both GPS sur-
veillance and cell phone surveillance often evoke references to 1984, George Orwell’s novel 
depicting a fictional society in which government surveillance and mind control is constant 
and pervasive. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at 
last.”); see also infra notes 401, 417 and accompanying text. 
 321. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279, at *46. 
 322. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786  (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 323. See Kravets, supra note 292; infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text. 
 324. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, cert. denied, Maynard v. United 
States, No. 10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (Nov. 29, 2010); see also supra Part II.B.2. 
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tein’s cell-site opinion325 were followed by two significant decisions in the 
ever-shifting plane of privacy jurisprudence.  In December 2010, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government must obtain a warrant to 
gain access to an individual’s email through an Internet service provider.326  
The following day, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Depart-
ment of Justice’s request for a rehearing of its decision retaining for magi-
strate judges the discretion to require warrants for historical cell-site infor-
mation.327  These decisions may represent a trend in cases reinforcing 
certain privacy rights in an age where cell phone technology, GPS devices, 
social networking, and Google Maps threaten to obliterate them. 
In Part III of this Note, I will examine how shifting ideas of privacy af-
fect the application of the Katz test to GPS surveillance.  As a primary mat-
ter, I will argue that in evaluating the true nature of the implications of GPS 
technology under the Fourth Amendment, the installation of these devices 
must be examined in tandem with their monitoring capabilities.  Second, I 
will argue for the adoption of a rule that GPS surveillance constitutes both 
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, because the expectation 
that government is not tracking its citizens electronically, twenty-four 
hours per day, is one that society still considers legitimate.328  Third, I will 
posit that neither public awareness nor popular use of location technology 
has eliminated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements twenty-four hours per day.329  Finally, I will argue that in the 
interest of consistency and equality in the application of Fourth Amend-
ment protections, this “split” should be resolved in favor of a warrant.330 
A. “The Nature of the Act”: Why the Installation and Monitoring 
Capabilities of GPS Technology Must be Viewed Together 
Part of the reason for the disarray in GPS case law is due to the chal-
lenge of applying traditional Fourth Amendment law to GPS technology, 
which confounds the analysis applied to searches and seizures.  As dis-
cussed in Part II, courts have analyzed GPS surveillance under search and 
 
 325. Orenstein Opinion, supra note 279; see also supra notes 293-321 and accompanying 
text. 
 326. See United States v. Warshak, Nos. 08-3997, 08-4212, 08-4085, 08-4429, 08-4087, 
09-3176, 2010 WL 5071766, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010). 
 327. In re Order Directing a Provider of Elect. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the 
Gov’t, No. 08-4227 (3rd Cir. Dec. 15, 2010) (denying petition for rehearing), available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/12/3rd_circ_rehearing_denied1.pdf; 
see also Kravets, supra note 292. 
 328. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 329. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 330. See infra Part III.D. 
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seizure doctrine by looking separately at the acts of installation and moni-
toring.331  However, this “bifurcated analytical framework,” which has its 
roots in earlier beeper cases,332 has become an overly formalistic approach 
that only clouds the real privacy interests at stake.  This framework has also 
led to somewhat absurd discussions of whether a defendant has an expecta-
tion of privacy in a few inches of space on the bumper of his vehicle, when 
the greater privacy interest is clearly in his movements twenty-four hours 
per day.333 
The complicating factor in analyzing GPS technology under the formal 
“search” and “seizure” inquiry is two-fold.  First, the device enables a type 
of simultaneous search and seizure; using satellite technology, it “searches” 
the suspect by tracking his movements, and “seizes” by instantly digitaliz-
ing the information, storing it on the device, and transmitting it to law en-
forcement.  Second, it is the ultimate capability of the GPS device—not the 
actual physical presence of the small black box—that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, converting a defendant’s vehicle into an instrument of the 
government.334  Analyzing the installation in a vacuum, separate from its 
monitoring capabilities, strips the device of its Fourth Amendment signific-
ance. 
In Garcia, for example, the Seventh Circuit found that the installation of 
a GPS device onto a vehicle did not constitute a seizure because the device 
did not: (1) affect the vehicle’s driving qualities; (2) draw power from the 
vehicle; (3) take up room in the vehicle; or (4) alter the appearance of the 
vehicle.335  This analysis is unsatisfactory however, because whether the 
device took up space on the vehicle or affected the vehicle’s performance is 
irrelevant to an individual’s expectation of privacy in his location data, and 
thus misses the extent of the government’s intrusion. 
B. GPS Surveillance Constitutes a Seizure Under the Fourth 
 
 331. See supra notes 79-98, 143-146, 229-234 and accompanying text. 
 332. See United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1979) (“[W]e adopt the Ninth 
Circuit’s ‘bifurcated analytical framework’ which examines the [F]ourth [A]mendment im-
plications of the installation or attachment of the beeper separately from the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment implications of monitoring its signals.” (citing United States v. Miroyan, 577 
F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1978))). 
 333. See, e.g., United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no 
search because “McIver did not produce any evidence to show that he intended to shield the 
undercarriage of his Toyota 4Runner from inspection by others”). 
 334. See Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 527 (Nev. 2002) (Rose, J., dissenting) (“If we fo-
cus only on a person’s expectation of privacy for his bumper . . . I believe we are missing 
the real impact of the intrusion on a person’s privacy [because] placing a monitor on an in-
dividual’s vehicle effectively tracks that person’s every movement just as if the person had 
it on his or her person.”). 
 335. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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Amendment 
Rather, as the Oregon Supreme Court in Campbell wrote, “[i]n order to 
decide whether the government has searched, we must look to the nature of 
the act.”336  The same can be said for whether an object has been “seized.”  
In fact, though it has received substantially less analysis,337 some have ar-
gued that the case for seizure may be even stronger than for search.338  Af-
ter all, it is in part the attachment of a technological device to private prop-
erty that separates GPS surveillance from visual surveillance.  While the 
Supreme Court did not decide the issue in Knotts, Justice Brennan wrote 
that the case would have been a much more difficult one “if respondent had 
challenged [the beeper’s] original installation.”339 
Indeed, examining the full capabilities of a GPS device in tandem with 
its monitoring capabilities demonstrates that the attachment of the device 
itself likely constitutes a seizure under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
While the Garcia court only focused on whether a GPS device created any 
physical interference with the vehicle’s use,340 a seizure of property occurs 
whenever there is some “meaningful interference with an individual’s pos-
sessory interest in that property.”341  Moreover, the government’s assertion 
of “dominion and control” over private property may be enough to consti-
tute a seizure.342 
Specifically, GPS can be said to constitute a seizure in two ways.  First, 
by using the GPS device to continually track an individual’s movements 
without his knowledge, law enforcement is infringing on his right to ex-
clude others from his property.343  Second, GPS surveillance interferes with 
an individual’s use and enjoyment of his property, for if law enforcement 
 
 336. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Or. 1988). 
 337. See Kothari, supra note 40, at 4 (“Because most seizures follow a search, the seizure 
prong of the Amendment has received little scholarly or judicial notice.”). 
 338. See, e.g., McIver, 186 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“[T]he owner of a 
vehicle has a possessory interest that is meaningfully interfered with if a transmitter is in-
stalled, even where the installation does not interfere with a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.”); Kothari, supra note 40, at 4-5 (“[S]eizure law . . . provides a better response to the 
applications of GPS technology than does search doctrine.”). 
 339. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 340. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
 341. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 342. Id. at 120. 
 343. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The owner of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all 
the world, including the Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his 
own purposes.  When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that prop-
erty, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property 
to its own use.”); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009). 
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had the legal ability to attach a tracking device to any vehicle without a 
warrant, simply using a vehicle would necessitate an individual’s submis-
sion to constant government surveillance.344  Both of these interferences 
are “meaningful” ones, as they make it virtually impossible to conceal pri-
vate property from possession and location by the government.345 
C. GPS Surveillance Constitutes a Search Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Furthermore, GPS surveillance constitutes a “search” under the Katz 
test.  As a threshold issue, GPS surveillance is not controlled by Knotts346 
for several reasons.  First, Knotts applied to an electronic beeper, which 
provided tracking for a limited duration of time, and the Court expressly 
reserved the matter of twenty-four hour surveillance for future determina-
tion.347  Second, GPS technology provides a much more intimate view of 
an individual’s life.348  Finally, Knotts did not decide the issue of the at-
tachment of the device itself to an individual’s personal property.349  There-
fore, we must return to the Supreme Court’s doctrine in Katz and examine 
subsequent case law to determine whether this type of government action 
violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
1. Exhibiting Subjective Expectations: The Difficulty of Katz’ First 
Prong 
Regardless of its murky or circular nature, the Katz test survives in its 
two-prong form.  The test is arguably complicated by Justice Harlan’s ite-
ration of the first prong, which asks whether the defendant “exhibited” a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the information he seeks to protect.350  
Because of the logistical ease of installing and monitoring GPS tracking 
devices (especially after the Ninth Circuit’s holding that law enforcement 
can attach a device to a car while it is parked in a driveway),351 it is quite 
difficult to “exhibit” an expectation of privacy in the aggregation of one’s 
 
 344. See Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 370. 
 345. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 346. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 347. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84), reh’g en banc denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 
766, cert. denied, Maynard v. United States, No. 10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (Nov. 29, 
2010). 
 348. See supra notes 224-227, 250-252 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
 350. See Harper, supra note 60, at 1386. 
 351. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g de-
nied, 617 F.3d 1120. 
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twenty-four hour location data.352  As the Fifth Circuit has noted, there is 
no “protective cloak” that can cover a vehicle to indicate a greater expecta-
tion of privacy.353 
It does not follow however, that people do not maintain a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy in their aggregated movements.  Indeed, in today’s 
world of satellite technology and the Internet, “[p]eople keep information 
about themselves private all the time without ‘exhibiting’ that interest in 
any perceptible way.”354  Individuals may maintain an expectation of pri-
vacy in their conversations, emails, or aggregated location information 
based on their own subjective understandings of privacy—whether legal, 
political, or philosophical—but display no conscious efforts to keep them 
private.355  This is in part because they do not exist in physical form, and in 
part because expectations of privacy are rarely “explicit” or “exhibited,” 
and are more often a part of habit or custom.356 
Thus, determinations as to whether an individual has erected “No Tres-
passing” signs on his property or parked his vehicle in a private garage are 
not indicative of actual privacy interests.357  How should a court treat the 
two-car family who parks one vehicle in their garage, and one in an ex-
posed driveway (to say nothing of the city-dwelling family that parks on a 
public street)?  Can we actually assume that the owners maintain varied 
expectations of privacy in their vehicles based on where they park them?  
Moreover, as Chief Judge Alex Kozinski noted in dissent to the denial of a 
rehearing of Pineda-Moreno, this type of reasoning necessarily demarcates 
subjective expectations of privacy on the basis of socio-economic factors 
such as income and housing.358  Individuals who live inside gated commun-
ities will always be able to claim a clearly demonstrated expectation of pri-
vacy, while those who live in apartment buildings without garages will be 
unable demonstrate a similar expectation.359  However, “the Constitution 
doesn’t prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his 
trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man whose 
 
 352. See Harper, supra note 60, at 1386. 
 353. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d en banc, 537 F.2d 
227 (1976). 
 354. See Harper, supra note 60, at 1386. 
 355. See id. at 1387. 
 356. See id. 
 357. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Sparks, 
No. 10-10067, 2010 WL 4595522, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) (reasoning that for a 
“modern urban multifamily apartment house,” the area of the curtilage was “necessarily 
much more limited”). 
 358. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 359. Id.; see also supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol.”360  A continuation of this 
type of analysis would be an unfortunate turn in Fourth Amendment juri-
sprudence, tying Fourth Amendment protections indirectly to factors of 
race and class. 
i. The Probabilistic Model361 
An individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in his movements 
twenty-four hours per day should not be derived from where he parks his 
car, but from whether or not this information has actually been “exposed” 
to anyone.362  Under the D.C. Circuit’s probabilistic analysis, whether 
something is exposed to the public depends not upon the theoretical possi-
bility but upon the actual likelihood of discovery by a stranger.363  In other 
words, while an individual may be aware of the technical possibility that 
someone may physically follow him twenty-four hours per day, for weeks 
or months at a time, the expectation that it will actually happen is “effec-
tively nil.”364  Thus, an individual’s subjective expectation that the gov-
ernment will not track him for four weeks,365 sixty-five days,366 or three 
months,367 is both actual and reasonable. 
Some courts have found this probabilistic analysis irrelevant because the 
Supreme Court has held certain government actions—rifling through a sus-
pect’s trash while it was placed on the curb,368 or renting an airplane to 
conduct aerial surveillance369—to be constitutional regardless of whether 
the action was expected by the defendants.370  However, the Supreme Court 
has indeed used probabilistic determinations in its calculation of whether a 
defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.371  In Bond v. United 
 
 360. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 361. For a discussion of probabilistic analysis, see supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
 362. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 363. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, cert. denied, Maynard v. United States, No. 
10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (Nov. 29, 2010). 
 364. Id. 
 365. The duration of GPS surveillance in Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
 366. The duration of GPS surveillance in People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1195 
(N.Y. 2009). 
 367. The minimum duration of GPS surveillance in United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 
604, 607 (8th Cir. 2010). See supra note 151. 
 368. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
 369. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
 370. United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067, 2010 WL 4595522, at *7 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 
2010). 
 371. See supra note 117. 
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States,372 for example, the Supreme Court held that the squeezing of a bus 
passenger’s luggage by a border patrol agent constituted a search because it 
exceeded what a reasonable bus passenger would expect in the handling of 
his luggage.373  Moreover, in California v. Ciraolo,374 while the Justices 
disagreed on the likelihood of aerial surveillance of a defendant’s private 
property, both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the proper 
inquiry to determine reasonableness included the probability that the sus-
pect’s property would be subject to observation by others.375 
ii. The Mosaic Theory 
Courts have also challenged the probabilistic model in light of the Su-
preme Court’s statement in Jacobsen that the concept of privacy is “criti-
cally different from the mere expectation . . . that certain facts will not 
come to the attention of the authorities.”376  However, GPS surveillance re-
veals much more than “certain facts.”  In fact, the quantitative and qualita-
tive information gathered from the aggregation of an individual’s location 
information over weeks or months can present an incredibly detailed view 
of an individual’s life.  Over the course of several weeks or months, indi-
viduals are guaranteed to pass through many different spheres, some of 
which they may subjectively consider more “private” than others, including 
places of worship, the doctor’s office, and political clubs.377  Because the 
sequence of a person’s movements can reveal more than individual 
glimpses, the whole is worth much more than the sum of its parts.378 
This detailed patchwork of information reveals the so-called “mosaic” of 
an individual’s life—a profile not simply of where he goes, but also of his 
associations—the implications of which conjure the protections of the First 
Amendment as well as the Fourth.379  In Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
where a search reveals “intimate details” of a private area, it deserves 
Fourth Amendment protection.380  Given that this intimate view of an indi-
 
 372. 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
 373. Id. at 338-39. 
 374. 476 U.S. at 207. 
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vidual’s life may reveal even more details than if the government entered 
and searched his home, and especially in light of the fact that the Fourth 
Amendment protects “people, not places,” obtaining this type of personal 
profile through GPS surveillance should require a warrant.381 
While the government has argued that finding a search under the Mosaic 
Theory unconstitutional would also therefore prohibit twenty-four hour 
visual surveillance,382 the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he fact that 
equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does 
not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.”383  
For example, “the police might . . . learn how many people are in a particu-
lar house by setting up year-round surveillance; but that does not make 
breaking and entering to find out the same information lawful.”384  Thus, 
while visual surveillance of a suspect twenty-four hours per day would be 
constitutional, attaching a device that utilizes satellite technology to his 
personal vehicle to aggregate his location information and send it to a re-
mote computer may still violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Visual surveillance can be further differentiated from GPS surveillance 
because people generally understand that law enforcement may follow 
them on a street or in a car.  They have sensory means of telling that they 
are being followed.  Suspects can maneuver to keep themselves hidden, 
staying on the run for days or weeks at a time.  If a person is following you, 
he is limited by human capabilities.  If an electronic device is following 
you, its capabilities are nearly limitless.385 
2. What Would Facebook Say? How Society Governs the Second Prong 
of Katz 
The second prong of the Katz test asks whether an individual’s actual 
expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable”386—or as the Court wrote in Knotts—“whether the person invok-
ing [Fourth Amendment] protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasona-
ble,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by 
government action.”387  If the government’s position were correct, we 
would have to accept that twenty-four hour surveillance is now something 
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society recognizes as reasonable, even where there is no ability for individ-
uals to detect when they are being scrutinized.  This premise is “nothing 
short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom,”388 even in an age 
of increased public awareness and use of location technology.  Indeed, pub-
lic awareness and use of this type of technology has not translated to a di-
minution in privacy expectations.  In fact, it is possible that we have begun 
to see an emergence of a trend solidifying some of these privacy interests in 
the age of Facebook and Google Street View. 
i. The Effect of Public Awareness and Use of GPS Technology 
The determination of “society’s” opinion is complicated not only by its 
inherent circularity,389 but by the newness of the “Information Age”—of 
Facebook, Google, iPhones, and Foursquare—because ideas of privacy 
within these mediums are still taking shape.390  The result has been, as 
some commentators have described it, “a battle” to determine, and in turn 
define, societal expectations.391  For example, the District Court in Sparks 
pointed to media coverage of GPS tracking by law enforcement in the in-
vestigation of Scott Peterson as evidence of public awareness of this prac-
tice, weighing against a defendant’s claim of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.392  However, mere public knowledge of a certain practice indicates 
neither acceptance of that practice (especially where its legality is in ques-
tion) nor a diminished expectation that they too will be tracked without a 
warrant.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court reminded us in Boyd v. United 
States: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least re-
pulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations 
from legal modes of procedure.”393 
Courts have also alluded to the fact that increased public use of GPS 
technology could indicate a diminished expectation of privacy in an indi-
vidual’s movements.  For example, in determining whether a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment occurred, the Supreme Court has looked at whether 
the technology was used by the public at large.394  However, public use of 
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or familiarity with a certain technology does not indicate that it is per se 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The recent decision by the Third 
Circuit allowing magistrate judges to require warrants for historical CSI 
demonstrates that even technology as ubiquitous as cell phone technology 
can still implicate the Fourth Amendment.395  Indeed, simply because a 
private company can access information in the content of emails or through 
cell phones, “the privacy expectation in the content of either is not dimi-
nished, because there is a societal expectation that the ISP or the phone 
company will not do so as a matter of course.”396 
Rather, despite the increasing use of GPS technology, there is no evi-
dence of a “corresponding societal expectation that government authorities 
will use such devices to track private citizens.”397  The Reddit.com com-
munity certainly did not appear to understand or accept as reasonable the 
government’s attachment and monitoring of a tracking device to the Cali-
fornia student’s car.398  And despite the District Court’s attempt in Sparks 
to glean public knowledge and acceptance of these practices from media 
reports,399 even a cursory survey of recent headlines regarding warrantless 
government tracking, either by vehicle or cell phone, reveals that aware-
ness of GPS and CSI surveillance has not resulted in acquiescence or a di-
minished expectation of privacy.400  In fact, it appears that just the opposite 
is true, as the myriad articles in newspapers, magazines, and blogs describ-
ing the practice have also noted the attendant controversy and concern.  For 
example, a February 2010 Newsweek Magazine article described cell phone 
tracking as “among the more unsettling forms of government surveillance, 
conjuring up Orwellian images of Big Brother,” suggesting that most of the 
nation’s 277 million cell phone users “don’t have a clue” that the govern-
ment could track them through their cell phones.401  Editorial boards from 
the New York Times to the Utah Daily Herald have opined in favor of re-
quiring a warrant for GPS tracking of vehicles.402  National Public Radio 
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produced a story on the Reddit.com student, noting the fear and anger 
caused by the FBI’s actions.403 
ii. Recent Privacy Invasions Produce a Demand for Greater Control 
In fact, public awareness of certain technological invasions of privacy 
has in some cases produced an increasing demand for control.404  General 
suggestions that, in the current climate of “over-sharing” on Facebook, 
MySpace, and Twitter, Americans have acquiesced to “the end of priva-
cy,”405 have been refuted by a number of recent events which reflect a 
growing trend towards maintaining and protecting privacy rights in an age 
of rapidly-evolving technology.  Facebook, which has been embroiled in 
several privacy concerns since its inception over the use of its members’ 
personal information, experienced another uproar in October 2010, after a 
Wall Street Journal investigation found that users’ identification informa-
tion was being transmitted to third parties via Facebook applications.406  In 
response to the controversy, Facebook took steps to “dramatically limit” 
the exposure of personal information and created a Facebook “Bill of 
Rights and Responsibilities.”407  Google’s endeavor to record 360-degree 
images of street corners throughout the world resulted in lawsuits and an 
FCC investigation after it became clear that the company had also collected 
personal information over wireless Internet networks in the process.408  
Meanwhile, public furor and a class action lawsuit over “Google Buzz” lit-
erally shut down the company’s first attempt to enter the social networking 
realm, after it became clear that they had added “followers” to users’ ac-
counts without first asking permission.409  It was this type of controversy 
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that caused Business Week to declare that contrary to popular belief, “Gen 
Yers” were just as concerned about their privacy as their parents.410 
Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission released a report in Decem-
ber 2010 calling for more transparency in how websites use the information 
they collect and for users to be able to opt out of having their personal data 
mined and shared with advertisers.411  The report even cited to the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Maynard for its proposition that com-
pilation of electronic data “poses different and more substantial privacy 
risks than collection of information regarding a discrete incident, because it 
offers the ability to obtain an intimate picture of an individual’s life.”412  
The U.S. Congress is considering a “Do-Not-Track” option for Internet 
surfing that would operate similarly to the Do-Not-Call list blocking tele-
marketers.413  Several state legislatures, including California, Hawaii, 
South Carolina, and Minnesota have passed statutes codifying the warrant 
requirement for use of tracking devices by the government.414  In Decem-
ber 2010, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the government must obtain a search 
warrant before seizing and searching emails stored by email service pro-
viders, marking the first time a federal appeals court has explicitly ex-
tended the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to email.415  Com-
menting on the case, Professor Jonathan Askin of Brooklyn Law School 
noted that these cases demonstrate that although the framers of the Consti-
tution may not have been able to consider modern modes of communica-
tion, this “does not mean that government gets a free pass to intercept and 
listen in without following constitutionally mandated process.”416 
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Ultimately, it is no longer sufficient to analogize twenty-four hour GPS 
surveillance to following a vehicle on public roads.  The battle that has 
broken out over GPS and cell phone surveillance—among privacy advo-
cates, judges, government, and the media—indicates that this type of action 
constitutes something much greater.  Indeed, “George Orwell’s 1984 would 
not retain its emotive power if people did not believe that they enjoy free-
dom from extensive, around-the-clock technological tracking.”417  Thus, 
for the sake protecting the significant privacy interests that are clearly still 
considered legitimate by our society, this “split” should be resolved in fa-
vor of a warrant. 
D. One Standard for All: Preserving Consistency in the Warrant 
Requirement 
GPS surveillance may very well be the most effective, efficient and in-
expensive way to conduct surveillance; in fact, no one is saying the gov-
ernment is prohibited from doing it.  Rather, all that is being asked is that 
the government obtain a warrant based on probable cause in order to main-
tain judicial supervision over a practice that is ripe for abuse.  As noted in 
Part I, from a practical perspective, the Fourth Amendment essentially 
functions as a procedural requirement; rather than prohibiting searches and 
seizures all together, it requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause.418  The historical judgment encapsulated by the 
Fourth Amendment was that unlimited discretion among those with inves-
tigatory and prosecutorial duties would produce pressure to “overlook po-
tential invasions of privacy.”419  Even the Supreme Court has made it ab-
undantly clear that it still considers judicial oversight over government 
surveillance necessary to prevent abuse by law enforcement;420 in Karo, the 
Court found the government’s argument that warrantless beeper searches 
should always be “reasonable” to be based upon “its deprecation of the 
benefits and exaggeration of the difficulties associated with procurement of 
a warrant.”421  Instead, the Court wrote, warrants are necessary in guaran-
teeing that tracking devices are not abused, “by imposing upon agents the 
requirement that they demonstrate in advance their justification for the de-
sired search.”422 
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In addition to the need for judicial supervision, GPS surveillance should 
require a warrant in the interest of consistency and equal application of our 
laws.  A closer inspection reveals that the case law regarding GPS surveil-
lance is far from clear.  While the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
held that GPS surveillance does not require a warrant,423 the Eighth Circuit 
required an intermediate showing of “reasonable suspicion” to justify use 
of the tracking device.424  Meanwhile, other circuits to consider the earlier 
form of beeper surveillance—including the First, Fifth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits—have similarly required varied showings of cause, from reasonable 
suspicion to probable cause, even in absence of a warrant requirement.425  
Thus, current Fourth Amendment law in fact contains a medley of stan-
dards for tracking devices, which is further complicated by the parallel 
standards being applied for cell phone surveillance.426  From this chaos, 
however, one thing is clear: it would not make legal or rational sense to al-
low two divergent standards for twenty-four hour electronic surveillance of 
citizens.  Dismissing GPS surveillance as neither search nor seizure would 
allow twenty-four hour tracking of citizens through their vehicles with no 
requirement of probable cause,427 while similar prospective (and perhaps 
even historical) tracking through cell phones would require a warrant.428  In 
the interest of consistency, efficiency, and protection against abuse, there 
should be one standard for twenty-four hour government surveillance by 
vehicle or by cell phone.  In light of the implications discussed above, this 
standard should be a warrant based on probable cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns over government intrusion into individual privacy are not new; 
rather, the historical context surrounding the Bill of Rights demonstrates 
that the Fourth Amendment was not merely a shield against the government 
entering a person’s house—it was a protection against government intru-
sion more generally.429  Perhaps this is why even those courts that have al-
lowed for warrantless GPS surveillance have noted with caution that this 
technology “enable[s], as the old (because of expense) do not, wholesale 
surveillance.”430  The court in Sparks even warned: “although we are not 
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yet faced with police overreaching, it may very well be near, and this Court 
and others will be keeping vigilant watch.”431 
Indeed, at the heart of this debate lies a deep-seated uneasiness with 
governments conducting surveillance of their citizens.  These hesitancies 
belie a political caution which attends government surveillance and has re-
fused to vanish from our societal conscience: “There is something creepy 
and un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior,” wrote 
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, dissenting from the denial of Pineda-Moreno’s 
rehearing.432  “To those of us who have lived under a totalitarian regime, 
there is an eerie feeling of déjà vu.”433  While trust in the national govern-
ment waxes and wanes, and technology continually introduces new means 
of mining the personal preferences of every citizen, our laws should remain 
steadfast in their protections.  Allowing GPS surveillance without any judi-
cial supervision would represent a giant step backward in this nation’s ap-
proach to individual freedoms. 
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